Criminal Procedure by University of the Pacific
McGeorge Law Review
Volume 9 | Issue 1 Article 24
1-1-1978
Criminal Procedure
University of the Pacific; McGeorge School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Legislation Commons
This Greensheet is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
University of the Pacific; McGeorge School of Law, Criminal Procedure, 9 Pac. L. J. 439 (1978).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol9/iss1/24
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Criminal Procedure; death penalty
Military and Veterans Code § 1672 (amended); Penal Code §§190, 190.1,
190.2, 190.3 (repealed); §§190, 190.1, 190.2, 190.3, 190.4, 190.5,
190.6 (new); §§37, 128,209, 219, 1018, 1050, 1103, 1105, 4500, 12310
(amended).
SB 155 (Deukmejian); STATS 1977, Ch 316
(Effective August 11, 1977)
Support: California Attorney General; California District Attorneys' As-
sociation
Opposition: American Civil Liberties Union; California Public Defen-
ders' Association
Rewrites California's capital punishment law; delineates those
crimes for which death may be imposed; establishes special cir-
cumstances, the existence of which may subject a defendant to
death; requires the sentencing authority to review aggravating and
mitigating circumstances before sentencing an offender to death or
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole; establishes
guidelines by which special circumstances and aggravating and
mitigating factors are evaluated.
Chapter 316 is an attempt to bring California law into consonance with
recent State and Federal Supreme Court decisions that prescribe certain
judicial procedures to be observed in the trial of defendants who may be
sentenced to death [See CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 316, §26, at -]. The new
law endeavors to emend the previous statute's constitutional inadequacies
by providing for a consideration of mitigating circumstances [See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.3]. Should such circumstances be found to exist, Chapter
316 permits a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole to
be imposed as an alternative to a sentence of death [See CAL. PENAL CODE
§190.3].
Before the enactment of Chapter 316, a defendant found guilty of first
degree murder received a mandatory sentence of death whenever the trier of
fact established the existence of one or more of the special circumstances
enumerated in the prior Section 190.2 of the Penal Code [CAL. STATS. 1973,
c. 719, §5, at 1299]. This inflexible standard left the sentencing authority
without the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances and without an
option as to the punishment to be imposed; for these reasons the prior capital
punishment law was declared unconstitutional by the California Supreme
Court in Rockwell v. Superior Court [18 Cal. 3d 420, 445, 556 P.2d 1101,
1116, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650, 665 (1976)]. Chapter 316 attempts to rectify
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these past deficiencies by instituting, in a trial for murder, a multi-phased
process that includes a penalty hearing in which to consider extenuating
circumstances [Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §§190.1 and 190.3 with CAL.
STATS. 1977, c. 316, §26, at -], thus granting to the trier of fact the
discretion to impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole [Cal. Penal Code §190.3].
Under the new procedure governing trials of capital offenses, the defend-
ant's guilt is first adjudged [CAL. PENAL CODE §190. 1(a)]. The trier of fact
in a trial of a defendant convicted of treason [CAL. PENAL CODE §37],
sabotage resulting in death [See CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE §1672(a)], willful
perjury resulting in the execution of an innocent person [CAL. PENAL CODE
§128], train wrecking or derailing resulting in death [CAL. PENAL CODE
§219], or deadly assault by a life prisoner [CAL. PENAL CODE §4500],
proceeds directly from the adjudication of his or her guilt to an evaluation of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances and the consequent determination
of penalty [CAL. PENAL CODE §190.3]. In cases, however, where the
defendant is found guilty of first degree murder, the trier of fact must then
determine if any of the special circumstances charged to the offender exist
[CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (a)].
Evaluation of Special Circumstances
Section 190.2 of the Penal Code outlines the special circumstances that
may be asserted against a defendant convicted of first degree murder: (1) the
killing was intentional and committed for a valuable consideration; (2) the
defendant with lethal intent physically aided or committed the act causing
death, and the murder was perpetrated by a destructive device or explosive;
(3) the defendant was present during the murder and, with lethal intent,
physically aided or committed the act causing death, and the victim was
either a peace officer killed in the line of duty or was a witness to a crime
killed to prevent his or her testimony in a criminal proceeding; (4) the
defendant was present during the murder, and with lethal intent, physically
aided or committed the act causing death and the murder occurred during the
commission or attempted commission of a robbery, kidnapping, rape, lewd
or lascivious act on a child, or burglary; (5) the murder involved the
infliction of torture, which must be established by proof of the defendant's
intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain; or (6) the defendant was
convicted of another murder in the first or second degree in the same trial or
in any previous proceeding [CAL. PENAL CODE §190.2]. Chapter 316 de-
fines "physically aided" as conduct constituting an assault or battery upon
the victim, or words or conduct ordering, initiating, or coercing the killing
of the victim [CAL. PENAL CODE §190.2(d)]. The trier of fact is required to
make a special finding that each of the special circumstances charged is true
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or untrue, and if reasonable doubt exists as to the truth of any special
circumstance, the defendant is entitled to a finding that it is untrue [CAL.
PENAL CODE §190.4(a)]. Moreover, if the existence of a special circum-
stance is dependent upon proof of the commission or attempted commission
of a felony listed under Section 190.2(c)(3) of the Penal Code (robbery,
kidnapping, rape, burglary, or a lewd act with a child), that felony must be
charged and proved as if the defendant were on trial for that offense alone
[See CAL. PENAL CODE §190.4(a)].
When a jury as the trier of fact determines the guilt of a defendant charged
with first degree murder, it must at the same time determine the validity of
the alleged special circumstances by evaluating the evidence presented at the
trial [Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §190.4(a) with CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190. 1(a)]. Whenever the jury fails to reach a unanimous verdict that all of
the special circumstances charged are not true and fails to find, by unanim-
ous verdict, that at least one of the alleged special circumstances is true, the
jury must be dismissed and a new one impaneled in its place [CAL. PENAL
CODE §190.4(a)]. Should this new jury also fail to reach the unanimous
verdict that one or more of the circumstances charged is true, it too will be
dismissed and the court will sentence the defendant to life imprisonment
with the possibility of parole [See CAL. PENAL CODE §190.4(a)]. If, howev-
er, the defendant pleads guilty or is convicted by the court sitting without a
jury, a jury must be impaneled to determine the truth of the special circum-
stances, unless waived by both the defendant and the prosecution [CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.4(a)]. In this limited situation, the law is unclear as to the
procedure to be taken if a jury is impaneled and it fails to clear the defendant
of all special circumstances and fails to find one or more of such special
circumstances to be true. Since there is no provision for impaneling a second
jury, as is the case when the defendant is convicted by a jury, it would
appear that the court would be required to sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole [See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.4(a)].
As noted, Section 190.4(a) requires that the determination of "the truth of
any or all of the special circumstances shall be made by the trier of fact on
the evidence presented at the trial." In light of this new limitation, it is not
clear by what method the court may educate any newly impaneled jury on
the facts of the case in which it must determine the truth of special
circumstances. If such a jury is to hear testimony that was originally
presented at trial, it is conceivable that this repeated testimony may involve
altered language or demeanor on the part of a witness. Since the concept of
"evidence" in California includes not only the words but also the demeanor
of a witness [See CAL. EVID. CODE §140, CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N
COMMENT], it may consequently be difficult to satisfy the requirement of the
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new law that the jury's determination of special circumstances be based
upon evidence presented at trial. This problem apparently exists when a new
jury is impaneled either following a plea of guilty, a court determination of
guilt in a first-degree murder trial, or failure of the jury that has convicted a
defendant of murder to reach consensus on the special circumstances [See
CAL. PENAL CODE §190.4(a)].
Apparently, the only new evidence that can be considered by the trier of
fact in evaluating the special circumstances is information presented at a
separate hearing demonstrating that the defendant had previously been
found guilty of first or second degree murder [See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.4(a). See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§190.1(b), 190.2(c)(5)]. For
purposes of evaluating this special circumstance, any act committed outside
of California, which if committed inside this state would have constituted
first or second degree murder, is considered to be first or second degree
murder. [Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §190.2(c)(5) with CAL. PENAL CODE
§§190.1(b) and 190.4(a)].
This limitation on the consideration of evidence in determining the verity
of any alleged special circumstance suggests that the prosecutor must not
only prove the elements of first degree murder, but must also present at the
guilt adjudication phase of the trial all evidence to be used in determining
the existence of a special circumstance [See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(a)].
Much of the information that is relevant in proving special circumstances,
however, may have little relevance to the question of guilt, and may even be
prejudicial to a fair determination of that question [See Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976)]. In Gregg v. Georgia [428 U.S. 153 (1976)], the
United States Supreme Court recognized that "[t]rial lawyers understand-
ably have little confidence in a solution that admits the evidence and trusts to
an instruction to the jury that it should be considered only in determining the
penalty and disregarded in assessing guilt" [id. at 191 (quoting MODEL
PENAL CODE §201.6, Comment 5 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959))]. Thus, it is
conceivable that a court, at the insistence of counsel for the defense, may
refuse to admit evidence that is immaterial or prejudicial to the issue of guilt
or innocence, but is crucial for proof of the validity of the alleged special
circumstances [See CAL. PENAL CODE §190.4(a)]. For example, one of the
special circumstances listed in Section 190.2 that may subject a defendant to
death is the killing of a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or
her duty [CAL. PENAL CODE §190.2(c)(1)]. In order to satisfy the require-
ment of this special circumstance, the defendant must have known or should
have known that the victim was an officer [CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)(1)].
Evidence of such knowledge, therefore, is crucial in determining the valid-
ity of the special circumstance [Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §190.2(c)(1)
with CAL. PENAL CODE §190.4(a)], but is arguably immaterial in proving
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 9
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the defendant guilty of murder and may consequently be inadmissible at trial
[See CAL. PENAL CODE §190.4(a)]. Under the new capital punishment law,
however, unless evidence of the defendant's knowledge of the victim's
identity is introduced at trial, Section 190.4 precludes the use of such proof
to evaluate the special circumstance [See CAL. PENAL CODE §190.4(a)].
This dilemma between the rules regulating the admissibility of evidence and
the need for information with which to appraise the verity of any charged
special circumstance might be resolved by an amendment to Section 190.4
that provides for the introduction of additional evidence during the special
circumstance phase of the proceeding [See CAL. PENAL CODE §190.4(a)].
Until the advent of such an amendment, however, prosecutors may arguably
avoid this predicament by not only charging the defendant with murder but
also with a lesser offense such as assault on a peace officer. Through the use
of such tactics, evidence demonstrating that the defendant knew or should
have known that his or her victim was a law enforcement officer would
probably be admissible since it not only supports the existence of a special
circumstance, but also tends to prove that the defendant is guilty of one of
the crimes for which he or she is currently on trial.
Determination of Penalty
A separate penalty hearing is convened to determine whether a sentence
of death or life imprisonment without parole shall be imposed upon a
defendant whenever he or she is convicted of first degree murder and the
trier of fact is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the
asserted special circumstances is true [CAL. PENAL CODE §190.4(a). See
generally CAL. PENAL CODE §190.3], or when the defendant is found guilty
of treason, sabotage resulting in death, willful perjury resulting in the
execution of an innocent person, train wrecking or derailing, or deadly
assault by a life prisoner [See CAL. PENAL CODE §190.3]. During this
penalty hearing, the trier of fact is to take into acount mitigating and
aggravating circumstances that may be presented by either the prosecution
or the defense, which include: the nature and circumstances of the crime for
which the defendant presently stands convicted; whether the defendant
engaged in prior violent criminal activity; whether the crime occurred while
the defendant was mentally or emotionally disturbed; whether the victim
participated in or consented to the homicidal act; whether the defendant
reasonably believed there was moral justification for his or her conduct;
whether the defendant acted under duress or under the "substantial domina-
tion" of a third person; whether mental disease or intoxication impaired the
defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to
conform his or her behavior to the requirements of the law; the defendant's
age at the time of the offense, as well as the defendant's character and
physical condition; and whether the defendant was an accomplice whose
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participation in the crime was relatively minor [See CAL. PENAL CODE
§190.3]. The trier of fact must also consider any other factors that may
"extenuate" the gravity of the crime [CAL. PENAL CODE §190.3(j)].
It is significant that Section 190.3 not only focuses the sentencing authori-
ty's attention upon the defendant's appreciation of the criminality of his or
her conduct but also upon the offender's capacity to conform to the require-
ments of the law [See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(g)]. This two-fold impaired
capacity test is similar to the test embodied in Section 4.01(1) of the Model
Penal Code [Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §190.3(g) with MODEL PENAL
CODE §4. 01 (1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962)] and is an important depar-
ture from the "M'Naughton test," which in a liberalized form, has been
traditionally applied in California [Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §190.3(g)
with People v. Wolf, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 799-803, 394 P.2d 959, 961-63, 40
Cal. Rptr. 271, 273-75 (1964) and People v. Crosier, 41 Cal. App. 3d 712,
716, 116 Cal. Rptr. 467, 470-71 (1974)]. A person cannot be convicted for
acts committed while insane and "[ifnsanity, under the California
M'Naughton test, denotes a mental condition which renders a person inca-
pable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act" [People
v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 574, 516 P.2d 875, 881, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171, 177
(1973)]. Apparently the new capital punishment law requires that both tests,
the impaired capacity test and the "M'Naughton test," he applied at
different stages of the judicial process [See CAL. PENAL CODE §§190. 1(c),
190.3(g)]. If the defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, the trier of
fact will, in the absence of further legislative directives, adjudge mental
capacity in the special sanity determination proceeding by applying the
narrower "M'Naughton test" [Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §190. 1(c) with
People v. Crosier, 41 Cal. App. 3d 712, 716, 116 Cal. Rptr. 467, 470-71
(1974)]. In the penalty hearing, however, the sentencing authority is to
apply the impaired capacity test, which is more closely aligned with the
Model Penal Code standard, to determine whether the defendant should be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
[See CAL. PENAL CODE §190.3(g)].
Chapter 316 prohibits evidence revealing prior nonviolent criminal activi-
ty from being presented in a penalty hearing [CAL. PENAL CODE §190.3].
Hence, for example, evidence of a prior conviction for forgery, as long as
the commission of the offense did not include the use of force, would not be
admissible at the penalty hearing [See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3]. The new
law also precludes the introduction of evidence establising prior criminal
activity on the part of the defendant involving an offense for which he or she
was later tried and acquitted [CAL. PENAL CODE §190.3]. Nevertheless,
evidence of prior criminal activity that included the use or attempted use of
force, for which the defendant was never convicted, but from which he or
she was never officially absolved, is apparently admissible [See CAL.
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PENAL CODE §190.3]. This suggests that a record of arrest for any violent
crime may be admitted into evidence against the defendant even though
charges were later dropped [See CAL. PENAL CODE §190.3].
The prosecution ordinarily cannot present evidence of aggravating cir-
cumstances unless the defendant receives notice, within a reasonable time
prior to the trial, that such evidence will be introduced [CAL. PENAL CODE
§190.3]. Evidence of aggravation, however, may be introduced without such
notice if it is used in rebuttal of evidence presented by the defendant in
mitigation [CAL. PENAL CODE §190.3]. After receiving all relevant evi-
dence, the trier of fact is required to "consider, take into account and be
guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances" in determining
whether the offender's penalty should be death or life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole [CAL. PENAL CODE §190.3].
The new law also requires that the trier of fact at the penalty hearing be a
jury unless this right is waived by both the defendant and the prosecution
[CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(b)]. If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous
verdict as to the penalty to be exacted, the court shall dismiss the jury and
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without possibility of parole
[CAL. PENAL CODE §190.4(b)].
Review
Whenever the trier of fact sentences a defendant to death, the court must
assume that a request for modification of the verdict or finding pursuant to
Section 1181(7) of the Penal Code has been filed [CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.4(e)]. This requires the judge to "review the evidence, consider, take
into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances" and to make an independent determination of whether the weight
of the evidence supports the jury's findings and verdicts [CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.4(e)]. The judge is required to enter the reasons for his or her findings
in the record of the proceedings [See CAL. PENAL CODE §190.4(e)]. If the
magistrate grants a modification of the verdict, the grant must be reviewed if
the people elect to appeal pursuant to Section 1238(a)(6) of the Penal Code
[See CAL. PENAL CODE §190.4(e)]. If the request for the modification is
denied, the denial will be reviewed during the course of the defendant's
automatic appeal to the state supreme court in conformance to Section
1239(b) of the Penal Code [CAL. PENAL CODE §190.4(e)].
Section 190.6 newly added to the Penal Code, dictates that the state
supreme court, which has appellate jurisdiction in all cases in which a
person has been sentenced to death [CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 11], render
judgment on this automatic appeal within 150 days of the certification of the
record by the court that sentenced the defendant to death. If the supreme
court fails to meet this deadline, Chapter 316 requires the chief justice to
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state for the record the justification for the delay [CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.6]. The new law specifically indicates, however, that such a delay in
the appeal process is not a sufficient basis to preclude the ultimate execution
of the sentence [CAL. PENAL CODE §190.6].
Evaluation of Sanity
Whenever a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to
Section 1026 of the Penal Code, the above described procedures, normally
employed in the trials of capital offenses, are altered to include a sanity
hearing. [Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §190.1(C) with CAL. PENAL CODE
§190.4(c)]. The law specifically directs that the sanity determination be
made whenever such a defendant has been convicted of first degree murder
and the trier of fact has held that one or more of the alleged special
circumstances are true [CAL. PENAL CODE §190.1(c)]. The new law, how-
ever, contains no express provision for a sanity determination when the trier
of fact absolves this defendant of all special circumstances. Presumably, in
the absence of other statutory direction, Section 1026 intervenes, granting
such a defendant an evaluation of his or her sanity before a sentence is
pronounced. If adjudged sane, this offender apparently is sentenced to life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole [Compare CAL. PENAL CODE
§190.4(a) with CAL. PENAL CODE §§1026 and 1190]. In the case in which a
defendant was convicted by a jury, and that jury fails to reach a unanimous
verdict that one or more of the charged special circumstances are true and
does not find that all of the changed circumstances are false, it must be
dismissed and a new jury impaneled [CAL. PENAL CODE §190.4(a)]. In the
event this "new jury is unable to reach the unanimous verdict that one or
more of the special circumstanes it is trying are true," the court is specifical-
ly directed to impose a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of
parole [See CAL. PENAL CODE §190.4(a)]. The imposition of this sentence
immediately upon the second jury's failure to reach unanimity seemingly
precludes the advent of a sanity hearing. Thus, if the law is strictly con-
strued, it is conceivable that a defendant who is legally insane may be
automatically sentenced to life imprisonment without having his or her
sanity judicially evaluated [See CAL. PENAL CODE §190.4(a)]. In order to
avoid this anomalous, albeit limited, situation and thus guarantee the de-
fendant's right to a sanity hearing, it is likely that the courts will subordinate
this particular sentencing directive of Section 190.4(a) to the general sanity
and sentencing procedures mandated by Section 1026. Finally, similar to the
prior capital punishment law, Chapter 316 provides that if the trier of fact
that convicted the defendant of a crime for which he or she may be subjected
to the death penalty was a jury, the same jury must consider any plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity, the truth of any special circumstances alleged,
and the penalty to be applied, unless for good cause shown, the court
--- Pacific Law Journal Vol. 9
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discharges the jury in which case a new jury must be impaneled [Compare
CAL. PENAL CODE §190.4(c) with CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 719, §4, at 1298].
General Provisions
Chapter 316 retains provisions of the prior law forbidding a sentence of
death from being imposed upon anyone under 18 years of age at the time he
or she committed the offense [Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §190.5(a) with
CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 719, §6, at 1300]. Unless otherwise provided, a death
sentence may not be imposed upon any principal in a capital crime unless he
or she was present during the act causing the victim's death and intentionally
either physically aided or personally committed such act [CAL. PENAL CODE
§190.5(b)]. Excepted from this general provision are those persons: (1)
convicted of violating Penal Code Sections 37 (treason), 128 (procurement
by perjury of the execution of an innocent person), 190.2(b) (murder by
destructive device or explosive), or 4500 (deadly assault by a life prisoner);
(2) convicted of violating Section 1672(a) of the Military and Veterans Code
(sabotage resulting in death); or (3) convicted of murder committed pursuant
to an agreement defined in Penal Code Section 190.2(a) [See CAL. PENAL
CODE §190.5(b)].
Chapter 316 will have several other miscellaneous effects. The new law
amends Section 1672(a) of the Military and Veterans Code and Sections 37,
128, and 219 of the Penal Code so as to generally grant the trier of fact the
alternative of sentencing violators to death or life imprisonment without
possibility of parole. As amended, Section 209 of the Penal Code reduces
from capital punishment to life imprisonment without parole the sentence
that may be applied to defendants found guilty of a kidnapping in which the
victim suffers death [Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §209(a) with CAL. STATS.
1976, c. 1139, §136.5, at -]. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 316,
Section 1103 of the Penal Code prohibited evidence of any overt act that was
not specifically charged from being admitted in a trial for treason [CAL.
STATS. 1880, c. 47, §69, at 22]. This prohibition has been relaxed to allow
evidence to be presented at the penalty hearing phase of the trial [Compare
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1103 with CAL. PENAL CODE §§190.3 and 190.41.
Section 4500 of the Penal Code, dealing with assaults by inmates sen-
tenced to life imprisonment, has been amended not only to provide life
imprisonment without parole as an alternative punishment to death, but also
to expand the scope of the section by making it a capital offense for an
inmate serving a life sentence to fatally assault another inmate [CAL. PENAL
CODE §4500]. Furthermore, under the old law, a defendant who willfully
and maliciously ignited an explosive causing mayhem or great bodily injury
could be sentenced to death [CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 771, §9, at 1458].
Chapter 316 revises Section 12310 of the Penal Code to provide for a
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maximum sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in
cases in which death is proximately caused by the defendant's act; if
mayhem or great bodily injury is the result, the defendant is to receive a
sentence of life imprisonment with the possiblity of parole.
Additionally, Section 23 of Chapter 316 declares that the discovery of an
invalid clause or phrase in any of the new and amended provisions will not
affect the validity of the remainder of the law [See CAL. STATS. 1977, c.
316, §23, at -]. If for any reason the provisions of Chapter 316 governing
the imposition of sentences of death or life imprisonment without possibility
of parole are abrogated by the courts, then offenders will receive the next
lowest penalty that is still in force [See CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 316, §24, at
-]. For example, if the death penalty is held unconstitutional, a defendant
who was sentenced to death will be resentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole, or if that penalty is also invalidated, to life
imprisonment with parole [See CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 316, §24, at -].
Thus, California's new capital punishment procedure not only mandates that
mitigating and aggravating circumstances be considered in determining a
defendant's punishment, but also seeks to establish clear and objective
guidelines by which sentencing authorities can fairly and consistently evalu-
ate such circumstances.
COMMENT
If Chapter 316 is to survive the inevitable constitutional challenge it must
rectify the procedural deficiencies noted in the prior law by the California
Supreme Court in Rockwell and satisfy the requirements established by the
United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia [408 U.S. 238 (1972)].
It must also follow the additional guidelines established in the more recent
cases of Gregg v. Georgia [428 U.S. 153 (1976)], Proffitt v. Florida [428
U.S. 242 (1976)], Jurek v. Texas [428 U.S. 262 (1976)], Woodson v. North
Carolina [428 U.S. 280 (1976)], and Roberts v. Louisiana [428 U.S. 325
(1976)].
In Furman the United States Supreme Court held that the mandatory
imposition and carrying out of the death penalty constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments of
the United States Constitution [See 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per
curiam)]. Thus, "Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a
sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a
human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action . . ." [Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976)
(plurality opinion)].
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In response to this constitutional mandate the California State Legislature
enacted a mandatory death penalty statute in 1973 that sought to prevent the
wanton application of death by removing all discretionary powers from
sentencing authorities in capital cases [See Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18
Cal. 3d 420, 446, 556 P.2d 1101, 1117, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650, 666 (1976)
(concurring opinion). See generally CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 719, §§4, 5, at
1298-99]. Subsequently, in 1976 the United States Supreme Court upheld
the discretionary capital punishment statutes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas
[Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (plurality opinion); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260 (1976) (plurality opinion); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262, 276-77 (1976) (plurality opinion)], while striking down the
mandatory death statutes of North Carolina and Louisiana [Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325, 336 (1976)]. In connection with these cases, the Court noted that a
sentence of death was not "cruel and unusual punishment" per se [Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (plurality opinion)]. The Court rea-
soned, however, that mandating the imposition of death regardless of
mitigating circumstances violates society's evolving standard of decency
respecting punishment and exacerbates the problem of arbitrary application
of sentences of death [See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293-
303 (1976) (plurality opinion)]. Additionally, the Court noted that in juris-
dictions which have enacted mandatory statutes, many juries hearing evi-
dence establishing the elements of a capital crime will nevertheless find a
defendant guilty of a lesser offense if they believe death is too severe a
punishment under the particular circumstances of the crime [Compare
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 302-03 (1976) (plurality opinion)
with Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 334-35 (1976) (plurality opinion)].
Consequently, under mandatory death penalty statutes, caprice is enhanced
by resting the determination of sentence upon a particular jury's willingness
to disregard the law [See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 334-35 (1976)
(plurality opinion)].
Upon an evaluation of the recent United States Supreme Court decisions
on the subject, the California Supreme Court in Rockwell held that the
provisions of the state's previous capital punishment statute, which were
similar to those of North Carolina and Louisiana statutes [18 Cal. 3d at 443,
556 P.2d at 1116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 665], violated the eighth and fourteenth
amendments since: death was mandatorily imposed for certain categories of
first degree murder; the sentencing authority had no opportunity to consider
mitigating circumstances before determining a penalty; and the law afforded
no detailed guidelines to help the sentencing authority determine whether
death was an appropriate punishment [See 18 Cal. 3d at 439, 556 P.2d at
1112, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 661].
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While Furman declared that caprice in capital sentencing, created by
unrestrained discretion, would not be tolerated, the Court in Gregg, Proffitt,
and Jurek clarified the means by which it hoped that such caprice could be
ameliorated. For example, in Gregg Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens
observed that discretion could be "controlled by clear and objective stan-
dards" [428 U.S. at 198 (plurality opinion)] that focused the jury's attention
on the "specific circumstances of the crime: Was it committed in the course
of another capital felony? Was it committed for money? Was it committed
upon a peace officer or judicial officer? Was it committed in a particularly
heinous way or in a manner that endangered the lives of many persons?"
[Id. at 197 (plurality opinion)]. Additionally, these jurists noted that the
Georgia statute properly directed the jury's attention at the offender's
characteristics: "Does he have a record of prior convictions for capital
offenses? Are there any special circumstances about this defendant that
mitigate against imposing capital punishment (e.g., his youth, the extent of
his or her cooperation with the police, his emotional state at the time of the
crime)" [Id. (plurality opinion)]. Chapter 316 appears to provide sentencing
standards similar to those suggested in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek. Section
190.2 of the Penal Code requires the jury to evaluate the specific facts of the
crime to determine the existence of special circumstances, while Section
190.3 establishes clear and objective guidelines with which to assess
mitigating circumstances. Consequently, these provisions will probably be
found to conform to the constitutional standards most recently set forth by
the United States Supreme Court.
The most probable source of constitutional challenge to California's new
death penalty law may be the failure of Chapter 316 to mandate proportional
review of death sentences by a state appellate court. "Proportionality
review" provides assurance that the imposition of death in any given case is
not disproportionate to sentences handed down in other cases of similar
circumstances [See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1976) (plural-
ity opinion)]. In striking down the death penalty statutes of North Carolina
and Louisiana, the United State Supreme Court observed that neither state's
law provided for a meaningful appellate review that would limit the arbitrary
and capricious imposition of death [See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 302-03 (1976) (plurality opinion); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325, 335-36 (1976) (plurality opinion)]. "Proportionality review," as
suggested by Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens in Gregg, "substantial-
ly eliminates the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the
action of an aberrant jury" [428 U.S. at 206 (plurality opinion)]. The Court
noted that the Georgia statute, which it upheld, requires "that the State
Supreme Court review every death sentence to determine whether it was
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary
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factor, whether the evidence supports the findings of a statutory aggravating
circumstance, and '[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or dispro-
portionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the
crime and the defendant' [Id. at 204 (plurality opinion) (quoting GA. CODE
ANN. §27-2537(c)(3) (Supp. 1975))]. Thus, under Georgia law the state
supreme court will not affirm a death sentence" 'if the death penalty is only
rarely imposed for an act or it is substantially out of line with sentences
imposed for other acts. . .' " [Id. at 205 (plurality opinion)(quoting Coley
v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 831, 204 S.E.2d 612, 616 (1974))]. In Proffitt, the
Court observed that under the Florida law the state supreme court reviews a
sentence of death" 'in light of. . . other decisions and determine[s] whether
or not the punishment is too great"' [428 U.S. at 251 (plurality opinion)].
In Jurek, Justice Stewart quoted the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals when
it claimed that the Texas death penalty law insures that a sentence of death
"'will only be imposed for the same type of offenses which occur [sic]
under the same type of circumstances"' [428 U.S. at 270 (plurality opinion)
(quoting Jurek v. Texas, 522 S.W.2d 934, 939 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975))].
The reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Woodson and Roberts
coupled with the Court's observations in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek to
suggest that a capital punishment law that falls to provide for appellate
review which insures the proportionality of sentencing may be held uncon-
stitutional, since it may allow death to be imposed arbitrarily [See Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204-06 (1976) (plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Flori-
da, 428 U.S. 242, 250-53 (1976) (plurality opinion); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 302-03 (1976) (plurality opinion); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325, 335-36 (1976) (plurality opinion)].
Whether California's death penalty law allows the state supreme court to
provide this type of proportional review is, at best, unclear. The language of
this new law concerning appellate review is similar to that of the Florida and
Texas laws, which were deemed constitutionally sufficient [Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260 (1976) (plurality opinion)], in that all three of
these laws mandate an automatic review of cases in which the defendant has
been sentenced to death [Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §§190.4(e) and 1239
with FLA. STAT. ANN. §921.141(4)(West) and TEx. CRIM. PRO. CODE
ANN. §37.071 (Vernon)]. The Supreme Courts of Florida and Texas, howev-
er, have construed their review functions broadly, allowing them to modify
a trial court's sentence of death whenever it is excessive or disproportionate
[See State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1976); Jurek v. Texas, 522
S.W.2d 934, 939 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)]. For example, the Florida
Supreme Court interprets its review function in a manner that allows that
court to review cases in which a defendant is sentenced to death "in light of
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• . . other [cases involving similar circumstances] and determine whether
or not the punishment is too great" [State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla.
1976)]. In contrast, the California Supreme Court has historically construed
its review functions narrowly, limiting its evaluation to questions of law
involving the trial court's proceedings [See People v. Mooney, 176 Cal.
105, 107, 167 P. 696, 696 (1917) (construing CAL. CONST. art. VI, §4,
repealed Nov. 8, 1966). Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §1239 with CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1259]. Chapter 316 contains no language that expressly alters
this narrow construction and on numerous occasions the state supreme court
has specifically denied that it has the authority to substitute its judgment as
to the choice of penalty for that of the trier of fact [E.g., In re Andersen, 69
Cal. 2d 613, 623, 447 P.2d 117, 124, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 28 (1968); People v.
Lookadoo, 66 Cal. 2d 307, 327, 425 P.2d 208, 221, 57 Cal. Rptr. 608, 621
(1967); People v. Howk, 56 Cal. 2d 687, 699-701, 365 P.2d 426, 433-34,
16 Cal. Rptr. 370, 377-78 (1961)]. Moreover, since the appellate court
cannot generally look beyond the trial court record [People v. Mooney, 176
Cal. 105, 107, 167 P. 696, 696 (1917) (construing CAL. CONST art. VI, §4,
repealed Nov. 8, 1966); Comment, Post-Conviction Remedies in California
Death Penalty Cases, 11 STAN. L. REV. 94, 103 & n.20 (1958-59).
Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §1239 with CAL. PENAL CODE §1259], the
ability to compare a sentence of death imposed in a particular case with that
of sentences meted out in like cases may be severely limited. Yet, despite its
historically narrow construction of judicial review, the California Supreme
Court noted in Rockwell, albeit in dicta, that "[t]he automatic appeal from a
judgment imposing death (§ 1239) does offer the prompt review by a court of
statewide jurisdiction which the [United States Supreme Court] found to be
an additional 'check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty' in Gregg v. Georgia . . ." [18 Cal. 3d 420, 441, 556 P.2d 1101,
1113, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650, 662 (1976)]. This statement may signal the state
court's willingness to broaden the scope of its review and thus, evaluate the
proportionality of sentences of death. Unless such a change has in fact
occurred, however, it may be persuasively argued on the basis of past
construction that the state supreme court will refuse to modify a
sentence of death even when it finds that such a punishment is dispropor-
tionate to sentences in similar cases, in which case there may be sufficient
grounds upon which to adjudge the new law unconstitutional.
If the California Supreme Court expands its review function, it must be
further ascertained whether the record of the trial court affords the reviewing
body a basis for the "meaningful" review suggested by the 1976 United
States Supreme Court decisions. California's appellate review procedure,
which is nearly identical to that of Florida [Compare CAL. PENAL CODE
§§190.4(e) and 1239 with FLA. STAT. ANN. §921.141(3)-(4)(West)],
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requires the trial judge to make an independent determination as to whether
the weight of the evidence supports the jury's findings and verdicts, and to
state on the record the reasons for his or her findings [CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.4(e)]. Since this procedure affords this state's reviewing court at least
as much information as is made available to the reviewing court in Florida,
it appears that "meaningful appellate review of each. . . sentence is made
possible" [See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251 (1976) (plurality
opinion)].
Finally, the possibility that prosecuting authorities may attempt to apply
Chapter 316 retroactively cannot be dismissed, especially in light of the
recent United States Supreme Court's holding in Dobbert v. Florida [97 S.
Ct. 2290 (1977)]. In Dobbert, the defendant was convicted of murdering his
two children, one in December of 1971, and the other between January and
April of 1972 [Id. at 2295]. At the time of the commission of both murders,
Florida law provided that a defendant found guilty of a capital felony was to
be sentenced to death unless the jury's verdict included a recommendation
of mercy [Id. ]. In July of 1972 the Florida Supreme Court held that this
procedure was inconsistent with the requirements mandated by the United
States Supreme Court in Furman [Donaldson v. Sacks, 265 So. 2d 499, 501
(Fla. 1972)]; later that year Florida enacted a new capital punishment
procedure that, in 1976, was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in
Proffitt [97 S.Ct. at 2296. See generally Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976)]. Although these murders were committed while the prior capital
punishment law was still in force, it was under the amended procedure that
Dobbert was sentenced to death [See 97 S.Ct. at 2295-97]. Defendant
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, claiming, inter alia, that this
sentence violated the constitutional proscription against ex post facto laws
[Id. at 2297]. In a six to three decision the Court affirmed the judgment of
the Florida Supreme Court, noting not only that "the inhibition upon the
passage of ex post facto laws does not give a criminal a right to be tried, in
all respects, by the law in force when the crime charged was committed"
[Id. at 2298 (quoting Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 590 (1896))],
but also reasoning that "even though it may work to the disadvantage of a
defendant, a procedural change is not ex post facto" [97 S.Ct. at 2298].
Encouraged by this holding, California prosecutors may seek to apply the
procedural amendments of Chapter 316 to defendants who, prior to the
California Supreme Court decision in Rockwell, committed capital felonies.
In Gregg, Justice Stewart explained: "We do not intend to suggest that
only the above-described procedures would be permissible under Furman or
that any sentencing system construed along these general lines would inevit-
ably satisfy the concerns of Furman, for each distinct system must be
examined on an individual basis . . ." [428 U.S. at 194]. Thus, the success
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or failure of the new law in constructing a capital punishment statute
consonant with recent judicial guidelines must await determination by the
higher court and cannot be complacently predicted.
See Generally:
1) 5 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1973 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 321 (death penalty)
(1974).
Criminal Procedure; investigation and presentation funds in
capital cases
Penal Code §987.9 (new).
AB 938 (Goggin); STATS 1977, Ch 1048
(Effective September 24, 1977)
Support: California Attorneys for Criminal Justice; State of California
Public Defender
Chapter 1048 complements the recently enacted capital punishment stat-
ute by assuring the availability of adequate funds for the investigation,
preparation, and presentation of a defendant's case in the trial of a capital
crime [CAL. PENAL CODE §987.9]. The new law allows an indigent defend-
ant charged with a capital offense to solicit the court for funds with which to
pay investigators, experts, and others for assisting in the preparation and
presentation of his or her defense [CAL. PENAL CODE §987.9]. Although not
specifically defined by Chapter 1048, an indigent apparently is a defendant
for whom counsel has been appointed by the court, and who is unable to pay
the costs for such counsel as determined by Penal Code Section 987.8
[Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §987.9 with CAL. PENAL CODE §§987.2,
987.3 and 987.8]. Defendant's counsel must apply for such aid by an
affidavit that specifies that the requested amount is reasonably necessary for
the client's defense [CAL. PENAL CODE §987.9]. The reasonableness of the
requested assistance is then evaluated at an in camera hearing, by a judge of
the court other than the judge presiding over the defendant's trial. The
court's evaluation must be guided by the need to provide the accused with a
complete defense [CAL. PENAL CODE §987.9]. Apparently, Section 987.9 of
the Penal Code only requires defense counsel to specify to the reasonable-
ness of the total funds requested and does not demand an itemization to
guide the judge in determining whether the amount solicited is reasonable
[CAL. PENAL CODE §987.9]. Funds allotted the defendant by the court are
distributed to his or her counsel, who upon termination of the judicial
proceedings, must supply the court with an accounting of all moneys
received pursuant to this new law [CAL. PENAL CODE §987.9]. Finally,
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Chapter 1048 provides that any request for, or the contents of any applica-
tion for funds under this new law are confidential [CAL. PENAL CODE
§987.9]. Thus, Chapter 1048, an apparent companion measure to the new
capital punishment law [CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 1048, §§2, 4, at -, -],
makes funds available for the investigation, preparation, and presentation of
a defendant's case in a trial in which he or she is subject to the death penalty.
Criminal Procedure; preliminary hearings, trials
Penal Code §§859b, 1043, 1059 (amended).
AB 513 (Cordova); STATS 1977, Ch 1152
Support: California Attorney General; California Peace Officers' Associ-
ation
Chapter 1152 encourages the prompt disposition of criminal cases by
extending to the people the defendant's right to a timely preliminary hearing
[See CAL. PENAL CODE §859b], and by restricting the granting of con-
tinuances [See CAL. PENAL CODE §1050]. The new law also prescribes the
policies to be observed concerning the presence of the defendant at trial [See
CAL. PENAL CODE §1043].
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1152, Section 859b of the Penal Code
granted defendants in custody the right to a preliminary hearing within ten
court days of their plea or arraignment [CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1371, §1, at
2537]. The new law apparently extends this privilege to all defendants, in or
out of custody, and awards reciprocal rights to the people [See CAL. PENAL
CODE §859b]. Accordingly, the preliminary examination is required to
occur within ten court days unless both the defense and the prosecution
waive this privilege or good cause for a continuance is found pursuant to
Section 1050 of the Penal Code [CAL. PENAL CODE §859b]. No circum-
stance, however, will justify a continuance beyond ten court days if the
defendant is in custody at the time of the plea or arraignment and he or she
does not personally waive the right to a prompt preliminary examination
[CAL. PENAL CODE §859b]. In order to allow the district attorney and the
defendant sufficient time to prepare for the examination the magistrate must
allow at least two court days between the arraignment and the preliminary
hearing [See CAL. PENAL CODE §859b].
Prior to August 11, 1977, Section 1050 of the Penal Code allowed
continuances when they served the ends of justice [See CAL. STATS. 1959,
c. 1693, §2, at 4692]. With the override of the Governor's veto of the
capital punishment legislation, Section 1050 was effectively amended to
grant to the people and a defendant, inter alia, "reciprocal rights and
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interests in a speedy trial or other disposition" [CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 316,
§18, at - (effective August 11, 1977)]. Chapter 1152 further amends this
section to now limit the granting of continuances to those cases evidencing
"good cause," and extends to both the people and the defendant "the right
to an expeditious disposition" of a criminal case [CAL. PENAL CODE § 1050].
Thus, for a limited time the prosecution in a criminal case was expressly
granted the statutory right to a speedy trial. With the enactment of Chapter
1152, however, it is now arguable that the legislature has limited this right
to guarantee the people only an expeditious disposition of such cases and has
not intended to expressly grant the reciprocal rights to a speedy trial
[Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §1050 with CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 316, §18, at
-]. On the other hand, it is arguably supported by dicta in one recent
United States Supreme Court decision that the sixth amendment guarantee
of a speedy trial also protects a public and societal interest in such a speedy
trial [See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972)].
Though never expressly defined by Section 1050, "good cause" is to be
demonstrated in a memorandum and supporting affidavits or declarations
detailing the reasons for the deferment; this memorandum is to be filed
within two court days of the hearing that is to be postponed [CAL. PENAL
CODE §1050]. If granted, the continuance is limited to the length of time
shown to be necessary at the hearing on the motion [CAL. PENAL CODE
§1050]. Moreover, whenever a continuance is granted those facts demon-
strating the need for a deferment must be entered upon the minutes of the
court [CAL. PENAL CODE § 1050]. These amendments to Section 1050 appear
to be motivated by the legislature's desire to ameliorate the congestion of
California criminal courts and the resulting adverse consequences suffered
by the state and the defendant [See CAL. PENAL CODE §1050].
Chapter 1152 also amends Section 1053 of the Penal Code to require the
courts to proceed with the trial of one charged with a misdemeanor if,
pursuant to Penal Code Section 977(a), the defendant has authorized counsel
to proceed in his or her absence, unless there is good cause shown for a
continuance [CAL. PENAL CODE §1043(e)]. If the defendant fails to provide
such authorization and yet is absent at the time set for the trial or at any time
during the course of the trial, the court may, as under the prior law: (1)
continue the matter; (2) order bail forfeited or revoke the defendant's release
on his or her own recognizance; (3) issue a bench warrant; or (4) proceed
with the trial if the court determines that the accused, though cognizant that
the trial is being held, is nevertheless voluntarily absent [CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1043]. The new law apparently makes no revision to the rules concerning
the presence at trial of defendants charged with felonies [See CAL. PENAL
CODE §1043(a), (b), (c), (d)]. Thus, Chapter 1152 awards reciprocal rights
in a timely preliminary hearing to the people as well as to the defendant,
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attempts to restrict the granting of continuances, and amends the rules
governing court appearances in misdemeanor cases.
See Generally:
I) B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Trial, §306 (right to speedy trial) (Supp.
1975).
Criminal Procedure; career criminals
Penal Code Chapter 2.3 (commencing with §999b) (new).
SB 683 (Deukmejian); STATS 1977, Ch 1151
Support: California Peace Officers' Association; California Police Chiefs
Association
The enactment of Chapter 1151 is the legislative response to findings that
a disproportionate percentage of felonies are committed by a handful of
repeat offenders [CAL. PENAL CODE §999b]. The new law seeks to focus
prosecutorial effort upon such "career criminals" by offering financial
incentives and technical assistance to counties that establish Career Criminal
Prosecution Units [CAL. PENAL CODE §999c].
In 1975 the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration sponsored ex-
perimental career criminal units in 11 jurisdictions and by December of
1976 the number of these federally sponsored units had expanded to 20,
including programs operating in San Diego and San Francisco [NATIONAL
LEGAL DATA CENTER, INC., CAREER CRIMINAL PROGRAM OVERVIEW 4
(1976) (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal)]. A preliminary evaluation
of these habitual offender units discloses impressive results. A survey of
approximately two thousand defendants processed under career criminal
programs revealed that, on the average, habitual offender jurisdictions have
a 94 percent conviction rate [Id. at 17]. Moreover, 89 percent of these
convictions were for the most serious offense with which the defendant was
originally charged [Id. at 17]. By contrast, in 1974, Los Angeles, a non-
career criminal jurisdiction, convicted only 29 percent of all defendants for
the most serious offense charged [Id. at 17]. Another impressive result of
the career criminal units is the number of convicted felons sentenced to a
term of imprisonment. In 1973, in Los Angeles County only 12 percent of
the offenders convicted of burglary who had prior felony convictions were
sentenced to state prison [Id. at 18]. Under habitual offender programs 93
percent of the offenders with prior felony convictions were sentenced to
prison [Id. at 18]. Even more impressive than these figures is the impact of
habitual offender programs on the commission of serious crimes. Statistics
from the first nine months of 1976 reveal that 9 of the 11 original career
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criminal jurisdictions achieved an aggregate robbery reduction 73 percent
higher than the national urban average [Id. at 19].
Chapter 1151 establishes in the Office of Criminal Justice Planning a
program of financial and technical assistance to be awarded to counties that
create career criminal prosecution units in substantial compliance with the
guidelines detailed in this new law [CAL. PENAL CODE §999c(a)-(b)]. Sec-
tion 999d of the Penal Code requires habitual offender units that seek state
aid to adopt programs of enhanced prosecution, including: vertical prosecu-
torial representation "whereby the prosecutor who makes the initial filing or
appearance in a career criminal case will handle all subsequent court appear-
ances on that particular case through its conclusion" [NATIONAL LEGAL
DATA CENTER, INC., CAREER CRIMINAL PROGRAM OVERVIEW 7-8 (1976)
(copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal)]; assignment of highly qualified
investigators and prosecutors to career criminal cases; and significant reduc-
tion of caseloads for investigators and prosecutors assigned to habitual
offender cases.
Subject to reasonable prosecutorial discretion, Chapter 1151 mandates
that career criminal units seek a plea of guilty or a conviction on the most
serious crime charged against the defendant [CAL. PENAL CODE §999f(a)].
Moreover, prosecutors are not only required to resist the pretrial release of a
charged defendant meeting career criminal selection criteria [CAL. PENAL
CODE §999f(b). See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §999e(a)], but also to
make all reasonable efforts to reduce the time between arrest and the
disposition of a charge against such a defendant [CAL. PENAL CODE
§999f(d)]. Prosecuting authorities must also refuse to accept any negotiated
plea that: (1) permits a defendant to plead guilty or nolo contendere to any
offense other than the most serious crime with which he or she was
originally charged; (2) prohibits the prosecution from opposing the defend-
ant's request for a specified sentence, below the maximum allowable pun-
ishment; or (3) establishes a specific sentence below the maximum punish-
ment as the appropriate disposition of the case [CAL. PENAL CODE §999f(e)].
Moreover, the prosecutor is to make all reasonable efforts to persuade the
court to impose the most severe penalty provided by law upon offenders
convicted under career criminal programs [CAL. PENAL CODE §999f(c)].
Section 999g allows the prosecutor to digress from these guidelines whenev-
er the evidence falls to warrant prosecution for the most serious crime
charged; whenever prosecution for the most serious offense would not
increase the penalty; whenever prosecution for a lesser offense would
enhance the successful prosecution of other felony cases; or whenever
extraordinary circumstances demand the use of different policies in order to
promote the general purposes of the new law [CAL. PENAL CODE §999g].
The exercise of such prosecutorial discretion must be guided by considera-
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tions of the offender's character and background as well as by the number
and seriousness of the offense(s) with which he is charged [CAL. PENAL
CODE §999e(c)].
In order to be the subject of a career criminal prosecution a defendant
must not only be charged with the commission or attempted commission of a
robbery, burglary, arson, grand theft, grand theft auto, receiving stolen
property, or any criminal act relating to controlled substances in violation of
Section 11351 or 11352 of the Health and Safety Code, but the defendant
must also: (1) be contemporaneously prosecuted for three or more separate
offenses not arising out of the same transaction that involve one of the above
mentioned crimes; (2) have been convicted in the preceeding ten years of at
least one count of robbery while using a dangerous weapon, burglary of the
first degree, arson, rape, sodomy or oral copulation committed with force,
lewd or lascivious conduct committed upon a child, kidnapping under
Section 209 of the Penal Code, or murder; or (3) have been convicted at
least twice in the preceeding ten years of grand theft, grand theft auto,
receiving stolen property, robbery without the use of a dangerous weapon,
second degree burglary, kidnapping under Section 207 of the Penal Code,
assault with a deadly weapon, or any act relating to controlled substances in
violation of Section 11351 or 11352 of the Health and Safety Code [CAL.
PENAL CODE §999e]. Chapter 1151 explains that the ten year period
specified in the new law is to be exclusive of any time the defendant has
served in state prison [CAL. PENAL CODE §999e(a)]. The words "state
prison" are of significance in this provision, for they apparently create a
loophole in the law by allowing an offender who has just been released from
a ten year or longer term in a federal jurisdiction to commit a crime but not
be subject to the enhanced prosecutorial program established by Chapter
1151 [See CAL. PENAL CODE §999e(a)]. Moreover, it is noteworthy that a
defendant indicted for rape will not be the subject of a career criminal
prosecution under this new law since that crime was excluded from the-list
of felonies for which enhanced prosecutorial techniques will be applied [See
CAL. PENAL CODE §999e(a)]. Chapter 1151 also provides that the characteri-
zation of a defendant as a "career criminal" may not be communicated to
the trier of fact [CAL. PENAL CODE §999h].
If criminal statistics demonstrate that any of the previously listed
felonies present a particularly pressing problem in the county, Section
999e(b) permits a district attorney to limit the prosecutorial efforts of his or
her unit to defendants indicted for those offenses. Furthermore, the execu-
tive director of the State Office of Criminal Justice Planning is required to
annually prepare an evaluation of the habitual offender program and its
results [CAL. PENAL CODE §999c(e)]. This evaluation, which will be submit-
ted to the legislature, is to be compiled from information gathered through
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those county career criminal units receiving state funding [CAL. PENAL
CODE §999c(e)]. Finally, the provisions of Chapter 1151 are operative only
until January 1, 1982 [CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 1151, §3, at -].
The impressive results of existing career criminal units undoubtedly make
the adoption of enhanced prosecutorial techniques an attractive proposal to
district attorneys faced with a burgeoning crime rate. Thus, the offer of state
financial and technical assistance made by Chapter 1151 may make the
proposal as economically feasible as it is attractive to many California
communities that might otherwise be unable to fund such projects.
Criminal Procedure; evidence-rape prosecution
Evidence Code §352.1 (new).
SB 56 (Presley); STATS 1977, Ch 34
Support: California Attorney General; California District Attorneys' As-
sociation; California Peace Officers' Association
Section 352.1 has been added to the Evidence Code by Chapter 34
apparently to encourage the victims of certain sex crimes to report these
offenses and testify in court without fear of being harrassed by defendants or
their associates [Sacramento Bee, April 27, 1977, §A, at 7, col. 1]. This
new section permits trial courts to exclude evidence of a victim's address
and telephone number in a prosecution for sodomy, oral copulation, or rape
if the danger to the victim created by this disclosure outweighs the probative
value of the evidence [CAL. EvrD. CODE §352.1]. In this manner, Chapter
34 would appear to codify existing judicial practice [Compare CAL. EVID.
CODE §352.1 with United States v. Saletko, 452 F.2d 193, 195 (7th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1040 (1972) and People v. Benjamin, 52
Cal. App. 3d 63, 75, 124 Cal. Rptr. 799, 807 (1975)]. To exclude evidence
pursuant to Section 352.1, the district attorney must, prior to any hearing at
which the current address and telephone number of the victim may be
sought, enter a motion to exclude such evidence and notify the defendant
and his or her attorney of such motion. A court may then grant such a
motion and order all evidence of the victim's address and telephone number
excluded from the hearing in question if it finds that the probative value of
such evidence is outweighed by the creation of substantial danger to the
victim [CAL. PENAL CODE §352.1].
Although evidence relating to the address and telephone number of
victims of specified sex crimes may now be excluded, Section 352.1 makes
it clear that this limitation is not meant to abridge a defendant's right to
utilize criminal discovery procedures or to discover such information by
independent investigation. Consequently, while the address and telephone
information may not be disclosed at trial, if the victim is a material witness
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for the prosecution, the defendant is not precluded from discovering the
information and transmitting it to his or her associates. It is arguable that this
provision could undermine the previously stated purpose of this new law,
which is to protect the victims of sex crimes from harrassment by defendants
or their associates. Despite this potential limitation, however, Chapter 34
would appear to provide some protection from harrassment to victims of
certain sex crimes who report these offenses and testify in court against
suspected offenders.
COMMENT
In deciding whether a motion to exclude evidence of a sex crime victim's
address and telephone number should be granted, the courts are required to
weigh the degree of danger to which such a victim might be exposed by the
disclosure of the address and telephone number evidence against the proba-
tive value of such information to the defendant [See CAL. EVID. CODE
§352.1]. The courts in these cases must apparently find that the danger to
the victim is actual and not conjectural [United States v. Palermo, 410 F.2d
468, 472 (7th Cir. 1969); see People v. Mascarenas, 21 Cal. App. 3d 660,
667, 98 Cal. Rptr. 728, 732 (1971)]. It would appear, however, that such a
finding may be made, and evidence of a rape victim's address may be
properly excluded, even if the prosecution fails to present any evidence to
show actual danger to the victim [McGrath v. Vinzant, 528 F.2d 681, 683-
84 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2221 (1976)]. The Federal First
Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned in McGrath v. Vinzant [528 F.2d 681
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2221 (1976)] that the circumstances
of the crime of rape implicitly supported a finding of danger to the victim
and supplied the factual basis for making such a claim [1d. at 683-84]. Thus,
a California court apparently could require a finding of actual danger to the
victim before it would exclude address and telephone number information,
but the factual basis for such a finding may apparently be inferred from the
circumstances of the crime.
Once a court has made a finding that there is actual danger to the victim, it
must determine whether this danger outweighs the probative value of the
address and telephone number evidence, and, thus, decide whether to
exclude or admit this information [See CAL. EVID. CODE §352.1]. General-
ly, courts have found the probative value of address information to be
greatest when the right of a defendant to confront witnesses against him or
her would be jeopardized by nondisclosure of the evidence [Alford v.
United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1930)]. In Alford v. United States [282
U.S. 687 (1930)], the United States Supreme Court held that the right to
cross examine witnesses testifying for the prosecution includes the right to
establish the identity of the witness or victim through a name and address
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[Id. at 692]. In People v Brandow [12 Cal. App. 3d 749, 90 Cal. Rptr. 891
(1970)] a California Appellate Court found that the "credibility of the two
opposing witnesses constitutes the fulcrum upon which the determination of
the defendant's guilt or innocence must be balanced," and required disclos-
ure of the address [Id. at 755, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 895]. California case law has
further established that evidence of an informant's address is vital to the
determination of a defendant's case when the informant is the only source of
evidence against the defendant [Eleazer v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 847,
851-52, 464 P.2d 42, 44-45, 83 Cal. Rptr. 586, 588-89 (1970); People v.
Garcia, 67 Cal. 2d 830, 842-43, 434 P.2d 366, 373, 64 Cal. Rptr. 110, 118
(1967); People v. Mascarenas, 21 Cal. App. 3d 660, 667, 98 Cal. Rptr.
728, 732-33 (1971)]. Since there are usually only two eyewitnesses in a sex
crime case [People v. Delgado, 32 Cal. App. 3d 242, 249-50, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 399, 405 (1973)], establishing the credibility of the victim as a witness
would seem to be crucial to the determination of the case. The United States
Supreme Court noted in Smith v. Illinois [390 U.S. 129 (1968)] that "when
the credibility of a witness is in issue, the very starting point in 'exposing
falsehood and bringing out the truth' through cross-examination must neces-
sarily be to ask the witness who he is and where he lives" [Id. at 131].
Additionally, the Court in Smith noted that the witness' name and address
can lead to other sources of evidence both in and out of court, and to forbid
their disclosure would emasculate the right of cross-examination [Id. ].
California and federal courts have recognized, however, that a defend-
ant's constitutional right of confrontation is not absolute [See Smith v.
Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 132-33 (1968); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S.
687, 694 (1930); People v. Benjamin, 52 Cal. App. 3d 63, 75, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 799, 807 (1975); People v. Mardian, 47 Cal. App. 3d 16, 60, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 269, 285 (1975)]. Generally, when the defense has the opportunity to
conduct a complete cross-examination that establishes the credibility and
identity of the witness without disclosure of the witness' address, and the
prosecution shows that disclosure of the address will endanger the personal
safety of the witness, the evidence may be excluded without violating the
defendant's confrontation rights [United States v. Saletko, 452 F.2d 193,
195 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1040 (1972); People v. Benja-
min, 52 Cal. App. 3d 63, 75, 124 Cal. Rptr. 799, 807 (1975)]. A witness'
credibility can be established without disclosing an address through a cross-
examination as to present and past employment, past criminal records, and
duration of residence in the community [See United Stated v. Saletko, 452
F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1040 (1972); People v.
Mardian, 47 Cal. App. 3d 16, 40-41, 121 Cal. Rptr. 269, 285 (1975);
People v. Patejdl, 35 Cal. App. 3d 936,943-44, 111 Cal. Rptr. 191, 194-95
(1973)]. Thus, when the victim is a witness in a rape prosecution, unless her
A, Pacific Law Journal Vol. 9
Criminal Procedure
credibility can be established through extrinsic sources without disclosing
her current address and telephone number, the probative value of such
information would appear to be great.
Thus, Evidence Code Section 352.1 as enacted by Chapter 34, appears to
comply with constitutional requirements by allowing a defendant to confront
witnesses against him or her and recognizes the limitation on this constitu-
tional right by applying a balancing test to determine if the danger to the
victim caused by address disclosure outweighs the defendant's need for the
address evidence to challenge the credibility of the victim as a witness
against the defense.
See Generally:
1) B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Introduction of Evidence at Trial §1198 (right of cross-
examination in criminal cases) (2d ed. Supp. 1977).
Criminal Procedure; compensation to victims of crime
Government Code §13969.1 (new); §§13959, 13960, 13961, 13962,
13963, 13964, 13966, 13967, 13968, 13973 (amended); Penal Code
§§1203, 1203.1 (amended).
AB 1206 (Gage); STATS 1977, Ch 1123
Support: California Peace Officers' Association; State Board of Control
SB 83 (Nejedly); STATS 1977, Ch 521
Support: California District Attorneys' Association; California Peace
Officers' Association
SB 725 (Smith); STATS 1977, Ch 1122
SB 1032 (Behr); STATS 1977, Ch 636
Support: California Peace Officers' Association; California Department
of Finance; Legislative Analyst; State Board of Control
Establishes mandatory penalty assessments for all felony and
misdemeanor convictions; requires presentencing report by proba-
tion officer to include recommendation concerning restitution to
victim as a condition of probation and requires court to consider
such a condition; establishes minimum fine for perpetrators of
violent crimes causing injury or death who have ability to pay;
provides for discretionary partial compensation to victims; creates
procedures for reconsideration of decisions on applications for
compensation and for judicial review of such decisions; 'deletes
duties of Attorney General in victim compensation program; en-
larges class of persons eligible for compensation.
Legislation enacted in 1977 has significantly altered the law regarding
California's program for compensating victims of violent crime by making
more persons elibible, by shifting the burden of compensation to convicted
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criminals, and by altering procedures for awarding such compensation [See
generally CAL. Gov'T CODE §§13959-13974]. California has determined
that it is in the public interest to compensate victims who, as a direct result
of a violent crime, suffer a pecuniary loss from which they cannot recover
without serious financial hardship [CAL. Gov'T CODE §13959; see
CAL. GOV'T CODE 13960]. "Victims" as used in this context refers to
persons sustaining physical injury or death as a direct result of a crime of
violence [CAL. GOV'T CODE §13960(a)(2)], and those who assume to pay
medical or burial expenses incurred as a result of a death directly caused by
a violent crime [CAL. GOV'T CODE §13960(a)(3)]. The State Board of
Control is charged with approving applications for compensation when the
preponderance of evidence shows that the victim has met the criteria estab-
lished by the legislature for receipt of such aid [See CAL. GOv'T CODE
§§13960(c), 13964].
Fines and Penalty Assessments
Section 13967 of the Government Code has been amended to make all
persons convicted of felonies or misdemeanors in California subject to
penalty assessments of ten and five dollars, respectively, with the proceeds
to be used to finance indemnification of victims of violent crimes. Such
penalty assessments are to be in addition to any other penalty, including fine
or imprisonment, imposed by a court on convicted felons and misdemean-
ants [See CAL. GOV'T CODE §13967]. Although Penal Code Section 19d
indicates that unless otherwise provided by law, "all provisions of law
relating to misdemeanors shall apply to infractions," the California Legisla-
tive Counsel has issued an opinion that persons convicted of infractions are
not subject to the penalty assessments provided in Section 13967 [OP. CAL.
LEGIS. COUNSEL No. 15939 (Sept. 23, 1977) Crimes at 1].
Section 13967 retains provisions directing a court to order a person
convicted of a violent crime resulting in death or injury to another person to
pay a fine of up to $10,000, provided that the convicted person has the
ability to pay and that his or her dependents will not be forced to become
dependent upon welfare as a result of the fine being paid [Compare CAL.
STATS. 1973, c. 1144, §2, at 2351 with CAL. Gov'T CODE §13967]. Fines
or penalty assessments imposed pursuant to Section 13967 are not subject to
further assessments authorized by the Penal Code for the Peace Officer
Training Fund [CAL. Gov'T CODE § 13967. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE
§13521].
Presentencing Reports
Penal Code Section 1203 has been amended to require probation officers
to include in their presentencing report concerning a convicted felon
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whether the felon is required to pay a fine pursuant to Government Code
Section 13967. The report is also to include a recommendation as to whether
the court should require restitution to the victim as a condition of probation,
and if so, the means and manner of payment [CAL. PENAL CODE §1203(a)].
If the victim has been compensated by the state pursuant to Government
Code Sections 13959 through 13974, any restitution is to be made to the
State Indemnity Fund [CAL. PENAL CODE §1203(a)]. The presentencing
report is to be made available to the court, and the defense and prosecuting
attorneys, at least nine days prior to the hearing date set by the court on the
matter [CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(a)]. Subsequently, when granting an order
of probation, a court must now consider whether restitution shall be required
as a condition of probation [See CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.1].
Eligibility
California's victim compensation scheme does not extend to certain
crimes involving the operation of motor vehicles, aircraft, and water vehi-
cles [CAL. Gov'T CODE §13960(b)] except when the victim's injury is
intentionally caused [CAL. GOv'T CODE §13960(b)(1)] or caused by a
driver in violation of Vehicle Code Sections 20001 (felony hit and run
driving), 23101 (felony-misdemeanor drunk driving), 23102 (misdemeanor
drunk driving), or 23106 (felony-misdemeanor driving under the influence
of drugs) [CAL. GOv'T CODE §13960(b)(2)]. New legislation, however,
creates two additional exceptions to permit compensation for victims of
motor vehicle related crimes: (1) persons injured by a driver who was found
to be driving under the influence of drugs [CAL. Gov'T CODE
§13960(b)(2). See generally CAL. VEH. CODE §23105]; and (2) persons
injured or killed by a driver of a motor vehicle who is in the act of fleeing the
scene of a crime of violence in which he or she knowingly and willingly
participated [CAL. Gov'T CODE §13960(b)(3)].
Partial Compensation
Previously existing law made a victim, or the person whose injury or
death gave rise to the application, ineligible to receive compensation if: (1)
he or she knowingly and willingly participated in the crime giving rise to the
injury or death; (2) he or she failed to cooperate in the apprehension and
conviction of the criminal committing the crime; (3) the State Board of
Compensation found that he or she was involved in events leading up to the
crime to an extent that he or she should not recover; or (4) he or she would
not suffer serious financial hardship as a result of the injury [CAL. STATS.
1973, c. 1144, §2, at 2348-49]. Section 13964 of the Government Code has
been amended to provide that an application may be denied in whole or in
part if the victim will not suffer serious financial hardship [CAL. GOV'T
Selected 1977 California Legislation
Criminal Procedure
CODE §13964(a)(1)] or if the victim's involvement in events leading up to
the crime is such that denial would be appropriate [CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 13964(a)(2)]. "Serious financial hardship," in this context, means that as
a result of the injury or death, "the victim suffered pecuniary loss to the
extent that he can no longer meet essential obligations or expenses from
income or assets available for such purposes, or from indemnification or
financial assistance reasonably expected from any other source" [2 CAL.
ADM. CODE §649.5]. Thus, the apparent effect of this amendment is to
allow partial payment in cases the State Board of Control deems proper,
rather than to maintain the more stringent all-or-nothing approach for award-
ing compensation in specified instances [Compare CAL. Gov'T CODE
§13964 with CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 1144, §2, at 2348-49]. Participation in
the crime and failure to coperate in the apprehension and conviction of the
perpetrator, however, continue to be factors that preclude any recovery
[C .. GoV'T CODE §13964(b)(1), (2)].
Procedural Changes
Section 13969.1 has been added to the Government Code to provide that
all decisions of the State Board of Control be put in writing [CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 13969.1 (a)] and to establish procedures for the Board's reconsidera-
tion and/or judicial review of decisions concerning the disposition of appli-
cations for assistance [CAL. GoV'T CODE §13969.1(b), (c)]. The require-
ment that Board decisions be in writing is expressly intended to ensure
reasonable notice to applicants and not to require formal opinions by the
Board [CAL. Gov'T CODE §13969. 1(a)]. Reconsideration by the Board may
be by its own motion or upon request by the applicant or his or her
representative, if filed not more than 60 days after mailing or 30 days after
personal delivery of the original decision [CAL. Gov'T CODE § 13969.1 (b)].
Judicial review may be obtained by filing a petition for a writ of mandate in
accordance with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1088
within 30 days of the personal delivery or 60 days of the mailing of: (1) the
Board's original decision from which no request for reconsideration is made
[CAL. Gov'T CODE § 13969.1 (c)(1)]; (2) notice of rejection of request for
reconsideration [CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13969.1 (c)(2)]; or (3) final decision of
a reconsidered application [CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13969. 1(c)(3)].
Provisions have been retained from the former law whereby the state is to
be subrogated to the victim's right against the perpetrator of the crime to the
extent of the cash payments made to the victim by the state [CAL. GoV'T
CODE §13966(a)], and the state is to be entitled to a lien in the manner
provided for in Section 688.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure on any
recovery made by or on behalf of the victim [CAL. GOV'T CODE
§13966(b)]. Section 13966 now also requires that notice be given to the
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Board, or the Attorney General if the Board so specifies, if an action for
damages is brought by the victim, his or her guardian, personal representa-
tive, estate, or survivors against the person or persons liable for the injury or
death giving rise to a victim of crime compensation award [CAL. Gov'T
CODE §13966(c)]. Notice of the institution of legal proceedings, notice of
settlement, and all other notices required to be given to the judgment debtor
by Code of Civil Procedure Sections 681 through 723 are to be given by the
attorney employed to bring the action or, if no attorney is retained, by the
person(s) bringing the action [CAL. Gov'T CODE §13966(c)].
Finally, under prior law, the Attorney General was responsible for vari-
ous duties related to the compensation of victims of crime program, such as
checking the veracity of applications for compensation [CAL. STATS. 1973,
c. 1144, §1, at 2348] and establishing standards for duties of local law
enforcement agencies in regards to the program [CAL. STATS. 1973, c.
1144, §2, at 2351]. These duties formerly assigned to the Attorney General
have been transferred to the State Board of Control or its staff [Compare,
e.g., CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 1144, §1, at 2350, 2352 with CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§13962(c) and 13968(c). But cf. CAL. GOV'T CODE §13966(c) (notice that
victim has instituted action for damages against perpetrator to be given to
Attorney General if the Board so specifies)].
In conclusion, the California system for compensating victims of violent
crimes has been amended to establish procedures for reconsideration of
State Board of Control decisions on applications for assistance, to widen the
class of persons eligible to receive such compensation, to allow for partial
compensation to victims, and to make other procedural modifications,
including the transfer of duties formerly performed by the Attorney General
to the Board. In addition, all persons convicted of misdemeanors or felonies
must pay penalty assessments, which, along with fines collected from
persons convicted of violent crimes, will help finance the victim compensa-
tion program.
See Generally:
1) 2 CAL. ADM. CODE §§648-649.11 (indemnification of victims of crime).
2) B. WrrKIN, J. LEAvrrr, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Introduction §3A (compensation of victims)
(Supp. 1975).
3) Geis, Edelhertz, California's New Crime Victim Compensation Statute, 11 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 880 (1974).
Criminal Procedure; probation denial
Penal Code §§1203.08, 1203.09 (new);
Welfare and Institutions Code §707 (amended).
SB 370 (Deukmejian); STATS 1977, Ch 1150
Support: California Peace Officers Association
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SB 491 (Holmdahl); STATS 1977, Ch 735
Support: California District Attorneys' Association; California Peace
Officers' Association
SB 518 (Holmdahl); STATS 1977, Ch 1153
Support: California Correctional Officers' Association; California Dis-
trict Attorneys' Association; California Peace Officers' Association
Under the prior law, a court was only required to deny probation or
suspension of sentence to persons who had been convicted of certain violent
crimes or narcotic offenses [CAL. PENAL CODE §§1203.06, 1203.07], or
who had been convicted two or more times of designated felonies within a
ten year period [CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1135, §1, at -]. Chapters 735, 1150,
and 1153 provide additional restrictions on the granting of probation and the
suspending of sentences for certain repeat offenders, persons who commit
certain felonies against elderly or handicapped individuals, and persons who
commit designated felonies while on parole from state prison.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 735, the law provided that a person
convicted of a designated felony who had been convicted two or more times
of such a crime within ten years of the present conviction was not to be
granted probation or a suspended sentence [CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1135, § 1,
at -]. In an apparent effort to further discourage criminal acts by such
repeat offenders, Chapter 735 specifies that this ten year "wash out" period
now excludes any time during which a person has been confined in state or
federal prison [CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.08, as added, CAL. STATS. 1977,
c. 735, §1, at - (identical section number added by Chapter 1153 of the
Statutes of 1977)].
Chapter 1150 adds Penal Code Section 1203.09 to deny probation or the
granting of a suspended sentence to persons committing specified violent
crimes against persons 60 years of age and older or persons who are blind,
paraplegic or quadraplegic. The enumerated crimes committed against these
elderly and handicapped individuals for which probation or suspended
sentence must be denied are: murder, robbery, kidnapping, burglary of the
first degree, rape by force or threat and assault with intent to commit murder
or rape [CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.09(b)(i)-(ix)]. To be denied this type of
clemency, however, the perpetrator of such crimes must have known or
reasonably should have known of the particular victim's disability [CAL.
PENAL CODE §1203.09(a)]. The same criminal acts by a minor, 16 years of
age or older, against senior citizens or such handicapped individuals now
requires a court to order a probation investigation and report to determine
whether such a minor is a "fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the
juvenile court law" [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §707(b)(12)].
Chapter 1153 adds a provision to the Penal Code that requires denial of
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probation to, or suspension of sentences for, persons convicted of a felony
while on parole from a prior felony conviction [CAL. PENAL CODE
§1203.08, as added, CAL. STATS 1977, c. 1153, §1, at- (identical section
number added by Chapter 735 of the Statutes of 1977)]. As added, this
provision specifies that probation is denied only if the current offense is
punishable by imprisonment without an alternate county jail sentence or is a
violent offense such as murder, mayhem, rape, and kidnapping [CAL.
PENAL CODE §1203.08(a), as added, CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 1153, §1, at-.
See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5]. Additionally, the previous felony
conviction from which the person is on parole must have been a violent
felony as defined in Section 667.5(c) of the Penal Code [CAL. PENAL CODE
§1203.08(b), as added, CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 1153, §1, at-]. Finally, the
existence of any facts indicating a defendant's ineligibility for probation or
suspended sentence under either Chapter 1153 or Chapter 1150, relating to
crimes against the elderly and the handicapped, must be included in the
indictment or information of the crime charged and either be admitted by
the defendant in court, found to be true by a jury or a court sitting without a
jury, or found to be true based on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere [See
CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.08, as added, CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 1153, §1, at
-; CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.09]. Thus, Chapters 735, 1150 and 1153 add
to the circumstances and extend the period during which certain convicted
felons will absolutely be denied probation or a suspended sentence.
See Generally:
1) 7 PAc. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1975 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 392 (probation denial)(1976).
Criminal Procedure; Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act-revi-
sions
Corporations Code §25540 (amended); Government Code § 11563.5 (re-
pealed); §§11555, 11556 (amended); Health and Safety Code §§1390,
11383 (amended); Military and Veterans Code §1672 (amended); Penal
Code §§1170.1, 1170.1b, 1389.3, 2399, Article 2 (commencing with
§2920), Article 3 (commencing with §2940), Article 2 (commencing with
§3020), 3043, 3044, 3050, 3054, 3055, Article 4 (commencing with
§3100) (repealed); §2947 (new); §§148.1, 213, 480, 594, 597.5, 653h,
654, 664, 667.5, 969c, 969d, 1168, 1170, 1170.2, 1170.4, 1191, 1203,
1203.03, 1203.06, 1213.5, 1389.7, 2081.5, 2400, 2401.5, 2402, 2403,
2651, 2684, 2772, 2790, 2911, 2930, 2931, 2932, 3000, 3040, 3041,
3041.5, 3041.7, 3042, 3046, 3052, 3053, 3053.5, 3057, 3059, 3060,
3062, 3084, 4532, 4801, 4802, 4803, 4810, 4812, 4813, 4814, 4850,
4851, 4852.14, 4852.18, 5000, 5001, 5002, 5003.5, 5011, 5055, 5068,
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5076.1, 5076.2, 5082, 5089, 6053, 6081, 11193, 11194, 12022,
12022.5, 12022.6, 12022.7 (amended); §1170.la (amended and renum-
bered as § 1170.1); Welfare and Institutions Code § 11483 (amended).
AB 476 (Boatwright); STATS 1977, Ch 165
(Effective July 1, 1977)
Support: California District Attorneys' Association; California Peace
Officers' Association
Opposition: American Civil Liberties Union; State of California Public
Defender
With the enactment of Chapter 165, sentences imposed for violent and
repeat offenders under the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976
[hereinafter referred to as the 1976 Act] have been increased. Chapter 165
modifies certain provisions of the fixed-term law in apparent response to
some law enforcement officials' protests that the retroactive provisions of
the law could result in the release of numerous violent criminals [Sacramen-
to Bee, May 13, 1977, §A at 12, col. 3]. The major amendments made by
Chapter 165 involve increases in prison terms for those engaging in
specified aggravating conduct [See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170.1, 12022,
12022.5, 12022.6, 12022.7], increases for those who have previously
served time in prison [See CAL. PENAL CODE §3000(d)], and extensions
until April 1, 1978 in the review time allowed to impose determinate
sentences on those persons sentenced prior to July 1, 1977 [See CAL. PENAL
CODE §1170.2].
Sentencing
Under the 1976 Act, each offense given a determinate sentence is assign-
ed a lower, middle, and upper term; one of which is imposed after con-
sideration of the circumstances of the particular crime [CAL. PENAL CODE
§1 170(a)(2), (b)]. The sentence imposed by the judge from these terms is
referred to as the "base term" [See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(f)]. "En-
hancements" based on the conduct of the prisoner during commission of the
crime or his or her past prison record may then be added to this "base term"
[CAL. PENAL CODE §§667.5, 1170.1, 12022, 12022.5, 12022.6, 12022.7].
The amendments to sentencing enacted by Chapter 165 focus on enhance-
ments to the "base term" [See CAL. PENAL CODE §§667.5, 1170.1, 12022,
12022.5, 12022.6, 12022.7].
Penal Code Section 667.5 requires the imposition of additional prison
terms for each prior separate prison term served or for the commission of a
prior felony that resulted in conviction. Under the 1976 Act, Section
667.5(a) required a three-year enhancement to the terms for defendants
being sentenced for one of the violent felonies enumerated in Section
667.5(c) of the Penal Code, who had previously committed one of these
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violent felonies and for which he or she had served time in prison [CAL.
STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §268, at -]. The 1976 Act provided, however, that
if the defendant remained free of prison custody and free of a felony
conviction for ten years immediately preceding the filing of the accusatory
pleading for the crime for which he or she was being sentenced, the
enhancement would not apply [CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139 §268, at -1.
Section 667.5(a), as amended by Chapter 165, now requires the defendant
to remain free of the commission of an offense that results in a felony
conviction, for the ten years preceding the commission of the crime for
which he or she is now being sentenced. Chapter 165 has also eliminated the
discretion of the courts to strike the enhancement prescribed for persons
sentenced for violent felonies, by deleting the language from the 1976 Act
that allowed for such discretion in cases in which the court found mitigating
circumstances to justify foregoing the imposition of the enhancement [Com-
pare CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §268, at - with CAL. PENAL CODE
§667.5(a)]. In addition to this three year enhancement for those convicted of
prior violent felonies, Section 667.5 now also imposes an extra three year
term on those previously convicted of any crime punishable by a life
sentence or any offense m which the prisoner used a firearm [CAL. PENAL
CODE §667.5(a), (c)]. Further, Section 667.5(b) previously imposed a one
year enhancement for defendants who failed to remain free of prison custody
for the five years immediately preceding the filing of an accusatory plead-
ing that resulted in a new felony conviction [CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139,
§268, at-]. Pursuant to Chapter 165, to avoid this one year enhancement,
Section 667.5(b) now requires the defendant to remain free of both prison
custody and the commission of any felony that results in a conviction for the
five years preceding the commission of the felony for which he or she is now
being sentenced. Finally, Section 667.5 is amended to include within this
definition of a prior prison term, a commitment in excess of one year to the
State Department of Health as a mentally disordered sex offender following
a conviction for a felony [CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5(i)].
Chapter 165 also amends the enhancement provisions of the 1976 Act for
carrying or using firearms or deadly weapons [CAL. PENAL CODE §§12022,
12022.5]. Penal Code Section 12022(a) adds one year to the terms of
persons who were armed with a firearm during the commission of a crime
and Chapter 165 extends this additional term to principals of such crimes
even though not personally armed with the firearm [CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 12022(a)]. Section 12022 is further amended to specify that the one year
increase for use of a deadly weapon applies only if the prisoner personally
used such a weapon, and the specific enumeration of deadly weapons
included in the 1976 Act is now deleted by Chapter 165 [CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 12022(b)]. Penal Code Section 12022.5 is also clarified by Chapter 165 to
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provide that the two year enhancement for use of a firearm must involve
personal use. Furthermore, Chapter 165 has included the crime of assault
with a deadly weapon within the provisions of Section 12022.5, which
would also result in a two year enhancement to the "base term."
The sentence enhancement imposed by Section 12022.6 of the Penal
Code for excessive damage to, or loss of, property has been modified by
Chapter 165 to impose an additional one year prison term for losses that
exceed $25,000 [CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.6(a)] and an additional two year
term for losses that exceed $100,000 [CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.6(b)].
Pursuant to the 1976 Act, enhancements for property loss were computed by
a "base term" percentage formula and the law required that a taking or
property damage must be an element of the crime for which the enhance-
ment was to be imposed [CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §305.5, at-].
Chapter 165, on the other hand, imposes the additional terms if such a loss
occurs during the commission or attempted commision of any felony and it
has been demonstrated that the defendant possessed the specific intent to
cause the loss [CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.6].
Section 12022.7 of the Penal Code adds three years to the sentence of a
person who inflicts great bodily injury during the commission of a felony.
Under the 1976 Act, however, the law specifically defined the types of
injury that would constitute "great bodily injury" and failed to indicate
whether liability for this enhancement attached only to the defendant inflict-
ing such injury or to all other principals in the crime as well [See CAL.
STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §306, at-]. Chapter 165 redefines "great bodily
injury" as "a significant or substantial physical injury" and deletes the list
of physical conditions that were previously said to constitute such injury
[See CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.7]. Moreover, Section 12022.7 now clearly
requires that in order for the three year enhancement to apply, the "great
bodily injury" must be personally inflicted by the defendant and includes
assault with a deadly weapon and assault by means of force within the
exceptions to this section.
Other sentencing changes enacted by Chapter 165 include amendments to
the formula for determining the length of, and limits on, consecutive
sentences. A person sentenced under the determinate system serves con-
secutive terms for convictions of two or more felonies [CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170.1 (a)]. Sentence length for multiple felony convictions is determined
by combining the principal term, which is the greatest term actually im-
posed for any of the crimes plus any enhancements, the subordinate term,
which is one third of the middle term prescribed for each of the other
felonies, and any additional term imposed pursuant to Section 667.5 for
prior imprisonment [CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(a)]. Under the 1976 Act,
enhancements could not be attached to the subordinate term [CAL. STATS.
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1976, c. 1139, §273, at-]. Chapter 165, however, allows enhancements to
the subordinate term to be added for multiple felonies if the "other
felonies" are violent felonies as defined by Section 667.5(c) [CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170.1 (a)]. Moreover, the 1976 Act did not allow the aggregate of
the subordinate terms to exceed five years [CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139,
§273, at-], whereas Chapter 165 amends this provision to allow the total of
the subordinate terms for consecutive offenses to exceed five years if the
added time was imposed because of conviction for a violent crime, prior
imprisonment, or commission of a crime while in prison [CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170.1(a), (b)]. Prior to modification by Chapter 165, the determinate
sentencing law provided that the total term of imprisonment could not
exceed twice the base term unless the defendant was convicted of a violent
crime or the term was increased by an enhancement for use of a firearm or
deadly weapon or the defendant inflicted great bodily injury [CAL. STATS.
1976, c. 1139, §273, at-]. Chapter 165 adds to these exceptions those
crimes involving excessive property loss and crimes committed while in
prison [CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(f); see CAL. PENAL CODE §§1170.1(a),
12022.6]. Pursuant to the 1976 Act, even if the enhancements relating to
deadly weapons, and firearm use or great bodily injury all applied to a single
offense, the law allowed for the imposition of only one such enhancement
[CAL. STATS 1976, c. 1139, §273, at-]. Chapter 165, however, permits the
application of two enhancements if the "enhancing" conduct occurs during
the commission or attempted commission of rape, robbery, or burglary
[CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(d)]. Further, the 1976 Act imposed a separate
and consecutive sentence for crimes committed while in prison [CAL.
STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §273, at-]. Chapter 165 extends this provision to
crimes committed by defendants while on escape from prison [CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170. 1(b)].
Generally, the sentence imposed under the determinate sentencing law is
the middle term of the three specified for a particular offense [CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170(b)], but the 1976 Act provided a procedure for the imposition
of an upper or lower term upon a motion of counsel to introduce mitigating
or aggravating evidence at a separate hearing [CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139,
§273, at-]. Chapter 165 simplifies this procedure by no longer requiring a
separate hearing to introduce such evidence and by specifying that either
party may introduce evidence in aggravation or mitigation to dispute facts in
the record or to present additional facts by merely submitting a statement to
this effect at least four days prior to the time set for judgment [CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170(b)]. Moreover, determinate sentences that have been imposed
must be reviewed within the first year [CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(f)].
Chapter 165 now allows for a review of probation denial during this
sentence review procedure [CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(f)].
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In summary, the major sentencing changes made by Chapter 165 focus
on enhancements to the base term of punishment for repeat and violent
offenders. These changes appear to be consistent with the stated purpose of
determinate sentencing, which is to punish offenders [CAL. PENAL CODE
§1170(a)], and the implied purpose, which is to establish a fair system of
punishment proportionate to the gravity of the crime [See 8 PAC. L.J.,
REVIEW OF SELECTED 1976 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 292 (Uniform Deter-
minate Sentencing Act) (1977)]. Furthermore, in response to contentions
that the 1976 Act would have resulted in the wholesale release of a number
of violent criminals [Sacramento Bee, May 13, 1977, §A, at 12, col. 3],
Chapter 165 would appear to provide a means to prevent the possible
premature release of such persons.
Parole
Chapter 165 makes a number of changes in the Penal Code provisions
governing the granting of parole. Significantly, Chapter 165 has amended
Penal Code Section 3000 to declare that the purpose of parole is to provide
for successful reintegration of the offender into society. Furthermore, Sec-
tion 3000(d), as amended, increases the total potential parole time for parole
violators from one year to 18 months for persons sentenced under Penal
Code Section 1170 and from three to four years for persons sentenced to life
under Penal Code Section 1168. Chapter 165 further amends Section 3000
to make clear that sentences imposed under the determinate system must
include a period of parole [Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §3000 with CAL.
STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §278, at-]. Another clarification of Section 3000
made by Chapter 165 is that the parole provisions of the Determinate
Sentencing Act are prospective [CAL. PENAL CODE §3000(d)]. Prior to the
enactment of Chapter 165, the maximum period of parole under the 1976
Act was computed from the date of the initial granting of parole, which
would have resulted in the release of a prisoner who had served the
maximum parole period on or before July 1, 1977 [CAL. STATS. 1976, c.
1139, §278, at-]. Furthermore, the 1976 Act allowed the parole period to
run without interruption, which meant that a person who violated parole
could be reincarcerated only for the remainder of the maximum parole
period [See CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §278, at-]. Section 3000(d) now
provides that the maximum parole period must be computed from the date of
initial parole, or July 1, 1977, whichever is later, thereby ensuring prospec-
tive application of the parole provisions of the determinate sentencing law
and would no longer allow a prisoner to credit time spent reincarcerated for
parole violations against the total parole time imposed.
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Retroactivity
The Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976 was made retroactive
by Penal Code Section 1170.2, which provided that all prisoners sentenced
before July 1, 1977, were to have their sentences reviewed and conformed
to the new law by September 28, 1977 [CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §273,
at-]. Chapter 165, on the other hand, now gives the Community Release
Board until April 1, 1978 to review these sentences with a possible 90 day
extension beyond April 1, based upon a resolution by the Community
Release Board, unless such resolution is vetoed by either house of the
legislature [CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2(b)]. Furthermore, under the 1976
Act the Community Release Board was to be guided by, among other
things, what could be reasonably imposed upon a person convicted after the
effective date of the law for a similar crime and under similar circumstances
[CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §273, at-]. Chapter 165 has amended Section
1170.2(b) to not so limit the board to such guidelines, but fails to set out
new additional guidelines.
Reduction of Sentences
The 1976 Act sets forth a system whereby total imprisonment time may
be reduced by a system of credits against the person sentenced [See CAL.
PENAL CODE §§2931, 2932]. Prior to amendment by Chapter 165, Penal
Code Section 1203.03 allowed patients of the California Rehabilitation
Center to credit time spent as a patient against their total sentence time. As
amended, Section 1203.03 excludes "outpatients" from those allowed to
credit time spent as a patient [CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.03(g)].
Finally, Chapter 165 amends various code sections to bring them into
conformity with the determinate sentencing law and applies determinate
sentences to crimes not given fixed sentences by the 1976 Act [E.g., CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §1390; CAL. PENAL CODE §§148.1, 480, 653h,
2772, 2790].
The legislature declared in the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of
1976 "that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment" and that
"[t]his purpose is best served by terms proportionate to the seriousness of
the offense" [CAL. PENAL CODE §1 170(a)(1)]. Thus, the amendments to this
determinate sentencing law that have been enacted by Chapter 165 would
appear to further emphasize this objective by imposing more severe sen-
tences on repeat and violent offenders.
See Generally:
1) 8 PAC. L.J., REVIFW OF SELF.CTED 1976 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 282 (Uniform Determi-
nate Sentencing Act) (1977).
2) Cassou, Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California: The New Numbers Game,
9 PAc. L.J. 1 (1978).
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Criminal Procedure; judicial commitments-mentally disordered
sex offenders
Welfare and Institutions Code §§6316.1, 6316.2 (new); §6316 (amend-
ed); §6325.1 (amended and renumbered as 6325.2).
SB 1178 (Presley); STATS 1977, Ch 164
California law provides for the criminal commitment to a state hospital or
other mental health facility of mentally disordered sex offenders who the
court determines will benefit by treatment [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§6316. See generally CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§6300-6330]. Prior to the
enactment of Chapter 164, Section 6316 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code permitted the indeterminate criminal commitment of mentally disor-
dered sex offenders to a state hospital or other mental health facility,
provided that the indeterminate term of commitment did not exceed the
aggregate maximum prison term that could have been imposed for the
offense or offenses of which he or she was convicted [CAL. STATS. 1976, c.
1161, §9, at-].
By omitting the indeterminate commitment language from Section 6316,
Chapter 164 now permits the imposition of determinate terms for mentally
disordered sex offenders and provides specific procedures for calculating
such terms [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§6316.1-.2]. Section
6316.1 (a), as added by Chapter 164, establishes a formula for determining
criminal commitments for mentally disordered sex offenders who have
committed a felony on or after July 1, 1977. Under this formula such
persons are committed by the court for the longest term of imprisonment that
can be imposed pursuant to the determinate sentencing system [CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE §6316.1(a)]. Furthermore, the defendant's commitment
period is reduced only for time already spent in custody for his or her
offense and is not reduced for participation in work programs or for good
behavior pursuant to Penal Code Sections 2930, 2931 and 2932 [CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §6316.1(a)]. These commitment procedures also
apply to those persons who committed felonies prior to July 1, 1977, if those
felonies would have been given a determinate sentence under Penal Code
Sections 1168 or 1170 had the offense been committed after July 1, 1977
[CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §6316.1(b)]. Within 90 days of the date a
person is received by the State Department of Health, the Community
Release Board, not the court, is required to fix the sentence for these
offenders or notify the offender of the time scheduled for a hearing at which
his or her term will be fixed [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §6316.1 (b)], Terms
for persons who committed felonies prior to July 1, 1977, may exceed the
maximum term imposed pursuant to Section 6316.1(a) if at least two
members of a three member Community Release Board panel find specified
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aggravated circumstances, which include prior criminal convictions, the use
of a deadly weapon, or the infliction of great bodily injury during the
commission of the felony for which the person is being committed [CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §6316.1(b). See generally CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170.2(b)]. The procedures and guidelines of Penal Code Section 1170.2
must be followed when a hearing is conducted to impose this longer term,
and the hearing must be held prior to April 1, 1978 [CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §6316. 1(b)]. In addition, persons found to be mentally disordered sex
offenders who committed a misdemeanor either before or after July 1, 1977,
are now committed for a term equal to the maximum county jail term that
could have been imposed for such misdemeanor [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§6316.2].
Chapter 164 adds Penal Code Section 6316.2 to allow the commitment of
a mentally disordered sex offender to exceed the maximum term imposed
under Section 6316.1. This additional term can be imposed only if the
person committed a felony sex offense before or after July 1, 1977, or a
misdemeanor sex offense before July 1, 1977, and the person exhibits a
tendency that he or she will continue to commit sex offenses [CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §6316.2(a)]. If a person qualifies under these conditions as set
out in Section 6316.2(a), the prosecuting attorney, acting on the recom-
mendation of the Director of Health may submit a petition to the superior
court to have the sex offender's commitment extended beyond the maximum
term imposed under Section 6316.1 [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§6316.2(b)]. Such petition, however, must be filed 90 days before the end
of the original term imposed, must contain a statement of reasons for the
additional term, and must explain to the patient his or her rights to counsel
and jury trial, and must further explain that he or she is entitled to all other
constitutional rights that apply in any criminal proceeding [CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §6316.2(b)-(e)]. This additional commitment period is for one
year from the termination of the previous commitment or recommitment,
which would seem to indicate that a person's commitment time may be
extended more than once [See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §6316.2(f)].
Chapter 164 further states that Section 6316.2 will be in effect only until
January 1, 1979, at which time it will be repealed [CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §6316(i)].
Thus, the legislature by enacting Chapter 164, has attempted to prevent
the premature release of mentally disordered sex offenders [CAL. STATS.
1977, c. 164, §6, at-] and it is intended that this new law operate in
conjunction with other provisions of law that also became effective July 1,
1977, which were similarly designed to prevent the premature release of
numerous violent criminals pursuant to the Uniform Determinate Sentencing
Act. [See CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 165, §§13, 91-94, at-].
Selected 1977 California Legislation
Criminal Procedure
COMMENT
Since the provisions added by Chapter 164 apply retrospectively [CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §§6316.1, 6316.2] and could possibly impose longer
terms than could have been imposed upon the persons who committed
offenses prior to July 1, 1977, such provisions raise the spectre of violation
of the ex post facto protections contained in the United States and California
Constitutions [See U.S. CONST. art. 1, §10; CAL. CONST. art. 1, §9]. An
ex post facto law is one which, among other things, inflicts greater punish-
ment than the law imposed for the crime at the time it was committed [See,
e.g., Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1936); Kring v. Mis-
souri, 107 U.S. 221, 228 (1882); People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App. 2d 621,
629, 49 Cal. Rptr. 892, 898 (1966)].
Prior to January 1, 1977, persons committed pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code Section 6316 were subject to a civil commitment for an
indefinite period, either until rehabilitated, or if found untreatable, for life
[See In re Bevill, 68 Cal. 2d 854, 861, 442 P.2d 679, 682, 69 Cal. Rptr.
599, 602 (1968); CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 685, §3, at 1313]. Effective January
1, 1977, and prior to amendment by Chapter 164, Section 6316 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code provided that mentally disordered sex offend-
ers were to be criminally committed for an indeterminate term that could not
exceed the aggregate maximum term that could have been imposed for the
offense or offenses for which he or she was convicted [See CAL. STATS.
1976, c. 1101, §9, at-]. With the enactment of Chapter 164, mentally
disordered sex offenders must be criminally committed for a determinate
term with the possibility of serving an additional term if found to exhibit a
tendency to continue to commit sex offenses [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§6316.1, 6316.2]. In considering whether Chapter 164 constitutes an ex
post facto application of the law, only those persons sentenced between
January 1, 1977, and July 1, 1977, could be affected. Those persons
committed prior to January 1, 1977, were subject to civil commitment and
the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws relates to criminal
proceedings and commitments only and not to civil proceedings [See Fur-
nish v. Board of Medical Examiners, 149 Cal. App. 2d 326, 331, 308 P.2d
924, 927-28, (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 827 (1957)]. On the other
hand, persons declared mentally disordered sex offenders who committed an
offense and were criminally committed between January 1, 1977, and July
1, 1977, could have been given an aggregate maximum term under the
provision of Section 6316.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which
may now be increased beyond that maximum [See CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §6316.2]. If this increase in commitment is a punishment more
onerous than the standard of punishment that could have been applied to a
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crime committed before enactment of Chapter 164, it would be an uncon-
stitutional ex post facto law [See Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397,
401 (1936); In re Dewing, 19 Cal. 3d 54, 56-58, 560 P.2d 375, 375-76, 136
Cal. Rptr. 708, 708-09 (1977)].
Since Section 6316.2 applies only to those mentally disordered sex
offenders who are amenable to treatment [See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§6316, 6316.2(i)], it is arguable that the recommitment period will be
considered treatment rather than punishment. If found to be treatment, the
provision extending commitment would not violate constitutional protec-
tions against ex post facto law since an ex post facto law has been defined as
a law that inflicts a greater punishment than could have been imposed at the
time the crime was committed [See, e.g., Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S.
397, 401 (1936); Peopel v. Potter, 240 Cal. App. 2d 621, 629, 49 Cal. Rptr.
892, 898 (1966)], and would appear to exclude treatment. This "treatment"
rationale is bolstered by the language of Chapter 164, which provides that
any commitment of a mentally disordered sex offender pursuant to this
article places an affirmative obligation on the Department of Health to
provide treatment for the underlying causes of the person's mental disorder
[CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §6316.2(i)]. Conversely, Section 6 of Chapter
164 specifies that this new law is "designed to provide additional safeguards
against the premature release of dangerous persons," which appears to be
inconsistent with a "treatment" philosophy [CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 164, §6,
at-]. Furthermore, the extended commitment procedures specifically apply
to a person who "[s]uffers from a mental disorder, . . . is predisposed to
the commission of sexual offenses to such a degree that he presents a serious
threat of substantial harm to the health and safety of others" [CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §6316.2(a)(2)]. As stated in United States v. Brown [381 U.S.
437 (1965)]: "One of the reasons society imprisons those convicted of
crimes is to keep them from inflicting future harm, but that does not make
imprisonment any the less punishment" [Id. at 458]. Thus, the "protection
of society" purpose expressly stated in Chapter 164 may persuade a court to
consider this extended commitment as punishment [See CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §6316.2(a)(2)], and if the extended commitment inflicts a
greater punishment upon persons sentenced between January 1, and July 1,
1977 than they could have received at the time of commitment [Compare
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §6316.2 with CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1101, §9,
at-], it would appear to fall within the definition of an ex post facto
application of the law [Cf. Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1936)
(when less than maximum term allowed at time of commission of crime,
new statute imposing mandatory maximum term was ex post facto applica-
tion of the law); In re Dewing, 19 Cal. 3d 54, 560 P.2d 375, 136 Cal. Rptr.
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708 (1977) (declared legislation extending the maximum discharge date
from Youth Authority custody as applied to persons committed to such
custody prior to the enactment of the legislation to be an ex post facto
application of the law)].
See Generally:
1) 8 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OFSELECTED 1976 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 295 (mentally disordertd
sex offenders) (1977).
Criminal Procedure; incompetency to stand trial-developmen-
tally disabled
Penal Code §§1370.1 (repealed); §1370.1 (new); §§ 1367, 1369, 1370,
1375.5 (amended); Welfare and Institutions Code §6500.1 (amended).
AB 1722 (Lanterman); STATS 1977, Ch 695
Support: Regional Centers for the Developmentally Disabled; State of
California Public Defender
Chapter 695 has apparently been enacted to restructure the procedures
followed in the determination and restoration of the mental competence to
stand trial of developmentally disabled criminal defendants [See CAL.
PENAL CODE §§1369, 1370.1]. Under the prior law the procedures for
monitoring a developmentally disabled defendant's progress towards recov-
ering his or her mental competence differed from the procedures established
for monitoring the progress of a mentally disordered defendant [Compare
CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1158, §1, at - with CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1274, §4,
at 3393-95]. While retaining the basic distinction that developmentally
disabled defendants are to be handled by the regional center for devel-
opmental disabilities and mentally disordered defendants are to be handled
by the county mental health director, Chapter 695 establishes procedures for
the treatment and evaluation of developmentally disabled defendants to
parallel the procedures applicable to mentally disordered defendants pur-
suant to Section 1370 of the Penal Code [See CAL. PENAL CODE §§1370,
1370.1. See generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§38000-38500].
Furthermore, Chapter 695 makes clear that a person found to be incompe-
tent to stand trial as a result of a mental disorder, but who is also devel-
opmentally disabled, will be committed and treated in accordance with
procedures established for developmentally disabled persons [CAL. PENAL
CODE §1367. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §1370.1]. The term "devel-
opmentally disabled" is defined in Section 1370.1 of the Penal Code as a
disability that continues or can be expected to continue indefinitely, con-
stituting a substantial handicap for an individual including mental retarda-
tion, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, and autism. The term also includes hand-
icapping conditions closely related to mental retardation or requiring treat-
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ment similar to that required for the mentally retarded, while excluding
handicapping conditions solely physical in nature [CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1370.1 (a)]. A "mentally disordered" person is one who suffers from any
of the mental disorders set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders Current Edition of the American Psychiatric Association
[9 CAL. ADM. CODE §813].
Section 1367 of the Penal Code provides that no person can be tried or
adjudged to punishment while he or she is mentally incompetent. A person
is now deemed mentally incompetent to stand trial if, due to a mental
disorder or developmental disability, he or she is unable to understand the
nature of the proceedings and to assist counsel with his or her defense [CAL.
PENAL CODE §1367]. Section 1369 of the Penal Code sets forth the proce-
dures to be followed when a trial is held on the question of the defendant's
competency, including the provisions for the examination of the defendant
by pyschiatrists and/or psychologists. Section 1369 has been amended by
Chapter 695 to also require the court to appoint the director of the regional
center for the developmentally disabled or his or her designee to examine the
defendant when it is suspected that the defendant is developmentally disabl-
ed [CAL. PENAL CODE § 1369(a)]. Furthermore, to facilitate this examina-
tion, the court may now order a defendant to be confined in a state hospital
or residential facility designated by the regional center director for the
purpose of this examination [CAL. PENAL CODE §1369(a)].
Section 1370.1 of the Penal Code has been rewritten to provide commit-
ment and treatment procedures for developmentally disabled defendants that
parallel those established for defendants found to be incompetent to stand
trial due to a mental disorder [Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §1370.1 with
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1370]. When a developmentally disabled defendant is
found to be incompetent, pursuant to Section 1370.1 the trial or judgment is
suspended until the defendant regains his or her competence [CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1370.1 (a)]. The court is required to order the incompetent defendant
to be delivered by the sheriff or another designated person to a state hospital
for the developmentally disabled or to a residential facility approved by the
regional center director or placed under an outpatient treatment program
established pursuant to Section 1370.3 in order to promote the speedy
restoration of the defendant's mental competence [CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1370. 1(a)]. Once a developmentally disabled defendant has regained his or
her competence to stand trial, this person must be redelivered to the court at
which time criminal proceedings may resume, although any time spent in a
hospital, residential facility, or on outpatient treatment is credited to any
term of imprisonment to which the defendant is sentenced [CAL. PENAL
CODE §§1370.1(a), 1375.5].
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To aid the court in its determination, the regional center director or his or
her designee must evaluate the defendant and within 15 judicial days of the
order, recommend in writing whether the defendant should be required to
undergo outpatient treatment or be committed to a state hospital or residen-
tial facility [CAL. PENAL CODE § 1370.1(a)]. Section 1370.1 of the Penal
Code specifies that no defendant charged with the commission of certain
violent crimes including felonies involving death, great bodily injury, or
which pose a threat of great bodily injury, may be released on an outpatient
program for at least 90 days [CAL. PENAL CODE § 1370. 1(a)]. Before such a
developmentally disabled defendant may be released on outpatient treat-
ment, the court must determine that the defendant is eligible to be released
on bail or on his or her own recognizance [CAL. PENAL CODE § 1370. 1(a)].
A developmentally disabled defendant committed to a state hospital or
residential facility may be transferred to another state hospital or residential
facility upon court order [CAL. PENAL CODE § 1370. 1(a)]. The defendant or
prosecuting attorney, after receiving the required notification of the ordered
transfer, may contest the transfer by petitioning the court for a hearing [CAL.
PENAL CODE §1370.1(a)]. This hearing must be conducted by the same
standards used during a probation revocation hearing and must be held if
sufficient grounds exist, at which time the defendant and prosecuting attor-
ney may present evidence concerning the order to transfer [See CAL. PENAL
CODE §1370.1(a). See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.2].
To further bring the procedures followed for the developmentally disabled
in line with those applicable to the mentally disordered, Section 1370.1 now
requires the superintendent of the state hospital or residential facility to
which the developmentally disabled defendant has been committed or
placed on outpatient treatment to make a written report, within 90 days of
commitment, to the regional director or his or her designee on the defend-
ant's progress towards recovery of his or her mental competence [CAL.
PENAL CODE §1370.1(b)]. This report is to be immediately transmitted by
the regional center director to the court as part of the defendant's progress
report [CAL. PENAL CODE §1370.1(b)(1)]. If the report discloses that the
defendant is still mentally incompetent but that there is a substantial likeli-
hood that he or she will regain his or her competence in the foreseeable
future, the defendant must remain in the state hospital or residential facility
or on outpatient treatment [CAL. PENAL CODE §1370.1(b)(1)]. In addition,
Section 1370.1(b)(1) now requires progress reports to be made at six month
intervals or until the defendant regains his or her mental competence. The
regional center director must immediately transmit these progress reports to
the court and provide a copy of the reports to the defendant, the defendant's
attorney of record and any other interested person specified by the defendant
[CAL. PENAL CODE § 1370. 1(b)(4)]. If a developmentally disabled defendant
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is still confined or in an outpatient program after 18 months, the defendant
must be returned to the committing court and a new trial to determine his or
her competency pursuant to Section 1369 must be held [CAL. PENAL CODE
§1370.1(b)(2)].
Like mentally disordered criminal defendants, the developmentally dis-
abled defendant is no longer subject to further confinement in a state
hospital or residential facility or required to undergo outpatient treatment on
the basis of criminal charges if: (1) the criminal charges have been dismis-
sed before the defendant recovers competence; (2) the regional center
director's report filed after 90 days of evaluation, indicates there is no
substantial likelihood that the defendant will recover his or her competence
in the foreseeable future; or (3) the defendant has not regained his or her
competence within three years of commitment or within a period equal to
the maximum prison term for the most serious offense charged, whichever is
shorter [See CAL. PENAL CODE §1370.1(a)-(c)]. A developmentally disa-
bled defendant falling within any of the above categories, however, may be
civilly committed pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act or Section
6502 of the Welfare and Institutions Code if he or she is a danger to himself
or herself or others, which, for the purpose of Section 6500.1, now includes
any person who has been found to be incompetent to stand trial pursuant to
Section 1367 of the Penal Code and has been charged with the commission
of one of the specified violent crimes involving death, great bodily injury, or
which pose a threat of great bodily injury [CAL. PENAL CODE §1370.1(a)-
(c); see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §6500.1. See generally CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §§5000-5401, 6402]. In any event, Section 1370.1 provides that
all criminal charges may be dismissed in the furtherance of justice pursuant
to Section 1385 [CAL. PENAL CODE §1370.1(c)(2), (d)], or if the regional
center director recommends the dismissal of such charges based upon a
finding that the behavior of the defendant relating to the defendant's crimi-
nal offense has been eliminated [CAL. PENAL CODE §1370.1(d)]. Thus,
Chapter 695 has apparently been enacted to establish commitment proce-
dures for the developmentally disabled defendant found incompetent to
stand trial that parallel the commitment procedures used for the mentally
disordered defendants.
See Generally:
1) 8 PAC. L.J., REvIEw OF SFL.EC-rED 1976 CALIFORNIA LEGISL.ATION 382 (developmentally
disabled persons) (1977).
2) 6 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SEL.ECTED 1974 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 273 (commitment of
mentally incompetent criminal defendants) (1975).
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Criminal Procedure; withdrawal of guilty pleas-aliens
Penal Code §1016.5 (added).
SB 276 (Garcia); STATS 1977, Ch 1088
Support: California Attorneys for Criminal Justice; California Organiza-
tion of Police and Sheriffs; California Trial Lawyers' Association
Opposition: California District Attorney's Association; California Police
Officer's Association
Chapter 1088 adds Section 1016.5 to the Penal Code in an attempt to
promote fairness to legal aliens by removing the discretionary power of the
trial court to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea or plea of nolo
contendere in situations in which a legal alien defendant was not informed
that such a plea could result in deportation, exclusion of admission to the
United States, or denial of naturalization [CAL. PENAL CODE §1016.5]. In
People v. Superior Court [11 Cal. 3d 793, 523 P.2d 636, 114 Cal. Rptr.
596 (1974)], a guilty plea was set aside because defendant, his counsel, the
prosecutor, and the court were unaware that deportation could result from
this guilty plea [Id. at 795-96, 523 P.2d at 638, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 598].
Defendant's plea of guilty was not withdrawn, however, in People v. Flores
[38 Cal. App. 3d 484, 113 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1974)], since defendant's
counsel had informed him of the deportation risk and defendant's only
argument was that he did not understand the degree of risk involved [Id. at
488, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 274]. These two cases would appear to have
presented trial courts with the dilemma of deciding just when and what type
of "notice of consequences" must be provided to legal alien defendants.
Chapter 1088 seems to resolve this problem by now requiring a court to
inform legal alien defendants of the possibility of deportation, exclusion of
admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization, before accepting
defendant's plea of guilty or nolo contendere [CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1016.5(a)]. Additionally, Chapter 1088 provides that after explaining these
consequences to a legal alien defendant, such a defendant may request, and
the court must then grant, a reasonable opportunity for reconsideration prior
to entering a final plea [CAL. PENAL CODE §1016.5(b)]. If compliance with
the provisions of Section 1016.5(a)(b) are not met, upon motion of the
defendant, such failure to advise the defendant or record this advisement
requires the court to vacate the judgment and allows the defendant to
withdraw his or her plea of guilty or nolo contendere and enter a plea of not
guilty [CAL. PENAL CODE §1016.5(b)].
Further, Chapter 1088 specifies that no defendant shall be required to
disclose his or her alien status at the time the plea is entered and if a
defendant or his or her attorney are unaware of the consequences of convic-
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tion the court must now give the defendant a reasonable amount of time to
negotiate with the prosecuting agency [CAL. PENAL CODE §1016.5(d)].
Finally, in an apparent attempt to foreclose any arguments that could have
been raised as to the retroactive application of Chapter 1088, the legislature
specified the effective date of these provisions as January 1, 1978 [CAL.
PENAL CODE §1016.5(b), (c); see CAL. GOV'T CODE §9600].
See Generally:
I) 8 U.S.C. §1251(a)(4) (deportation of aliens-general classes) (1970).
Criminal Procedure; court interpreters for the deaf
Evidence Code §754 (amended).
SB 838 (Russell); Stats 1977, Ch 1182
Support: California Association for the Deaf
Statutory law previously required that interpreters only be provided by the
courts when a deaf person was the defendant in a criminal action or the
subject of a commitment proceeding [CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 299, §754, at
1314]. These prior provisions have been expanded by Chapter 1182 and
now require that qualified interpreters be employed when a deaf person is a
party to or a witness in, and is required to be present at any criminal action,
juvenile case or proceeding, proceeding to determine the mental competen-
cy of a person, or administrative hearing [CAL. EViD. CODE §754(b)].
Chapter 1182 defines a qualified interpreter for the deaf as one who: (1) has
been issued a certificate of competency appropriate for the purpose of
interpreting the specified proceedings by the National Registry of Interpre-
ters for the Deaf, by an affiliated state group, or by another group deter-
mined by the California Judicial Council to possess a level of competence in
training, testing and certification equivalent to that of the National Registry
[CAL. EVD. CODE §754(c)(1)]; and (2) has been included on a list of
recommended court interpreters to be established by the county superior
court [CAL. EVID. CODE §754(c)(2)]. If the only available interpreter does
not possess adequate skill for the particular situation, or if the interpreter is
not familiar with the slang of the deaf person, such person may appoint an
intermediary to act between himself or herself and the appointed interpreter
[CAL. EviD. CODE §754(d)]. Section 754(d), however, does not specify who
is to determine whether the available interpreter possesses adequate skills.
Nevertheless, it would appear that the court, since it must grant permission
for the nomination of intermediaries, may be best situated to make this
determination [See CAL. EVID. CODE §754(d)]. Neither the interpreter nor
the intermediary, however, may be an interested party, as such a relation-
ship may call into question the accuracy of the interpreted statement and
may constitute grounds for mistrial [Cf. People v. Walker, 69 Cal. App.
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475, 493, 231 P. 572, 579 (1925) (one of several grounds for mistrial was
based upon fact that defendant's wife acted as interpreter and appeared to
embellish upon defendant's statements)]. Additionally, no statement made
by a deaf person in response to a question of a peace officer may be admitted
into evidence against such person in a criminal or quasi-criminal proceed-
ing, unless the statement was either made or elicited knowingly, voluntarily
and intelligently through a qualified interpreter, or found specially by the
court to have been made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently [CAL.
EVD. CODE §754(f)]. Thus, Chapter 1182 would appear to enhance the
uniform quality and availability of court interpreters for the deaf and to
ensure that any statement made by a deaf person is voluntarily made and
accurately interpreted.
Criminal Procedure; psychological testing and counseling of child
abusers
Business and Professions Code §§2192, 2736 (amended); Penal Code
§§273ab, 1203h, 3001 (new).
AB 1596 (Antonovich); STATS 1977, Ch 1130
Support: California Child Care Coordinating Council; California Welfare
Directors Association; Delinquency Control Institute; Parents Anony-
mous
In an apparent response to the increasing incidence of child abuse [See R.
HEFLER & C. KEMPE, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT xv (1976)] and the
recognition that, through psychological treatment and counseling, most
child abusers can be successfully rehabilitated [See Steele & Pollock, A
Psychiatric Study of Parents Who Abuse Infants and Small Children, in
THE BATTERED CHILD 124 (1974)] the legislature has enacted Chapter 1130
to make certain changes in the criminal process for alleged and convicted
child abusers. Section 273ab has been added to the Penal Code to provide
that, in lieu of prosecuting an individual suspected of child abuse [See
generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§261.5, 270, 273a, 273d, 273g, 288, 288a],
the prosecuting attorney, with the advice of the county social services
department, may refer the individual to such county departments for coun-
seling and other related services [CAL. PENAL CODE §273ab], however, the
prosecuting attorney apparently lacks the authority to compel suspected
child abusers to undergo such counseling and other related therapy [Com-
pare CAL. PENAL CODE §273ab with AB 1596, 1977-78 Regular Session, as
introduced, April 13, 1977 and AB 1596, 1977-78 Regular Session, as
amended, May 17, 1977]. Section 273ab also declares that it is the intent of
the legislature that the "in lieu of prosecution" provision should not in any
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way deprive the prosecuting attorney of his or her ability to prosecute a
suspected child abuser "to the fullest extent of the law" if he or she so
chooses [CAL. PENAL CODE §273ab].
Presently, the trial court, in its discretion,. can order a convicted felon to
the diagnostic facility of the Department of Corrections, for a period not to
exceed 90 days, for the purpose of determining whether the individual
should undergo psychiatric or psychological treatment [CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1203.03]. The work of these diagnostic facilities includes a scientific study
of the prisoner, his or her life career, the cause of the criminal acts, and
recommendations for the prisoner's treatment, care, and employment with
the "view to his [or her] reformation and to the protection of society" [CAL.
PENAL CODE §5079]. Similarly, if a court now initiates a probation investi-
gation of a convicted child abuser, Chapter 1130 requires that this investiga-
tion include a "psychological evaluation," which is designed to determine
the extent of counseling necessary for "successful rehabilitation" of the
individual, and thus, to indicate to a court the amount of counseling that
should be required during a probation period [CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203h]. In
addition, the Community Release Board is now required to order the
preparation of such an evaluation on any convicted child abuser whose case
is reviewed by the board to determine the extent of counseling that may be
required as a condition of parole [CAL. PENAL CODE §3001]. This evaluation
can be prepared by psychologists or licensed clinical social workers as well
as psychiatrists [CAL. PENAL CODE §§1203h, 3001]. Apparently, psycholo-
gists and licensed clinical social workers are less expensive and more
accessible to probation officers than psychiatrists [Memorandum from As-
sembly Office of Research to Assemblyman Mike D. Antonovich, June 10,
1977 (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal)]. In addition, it is believed that
because these professionals have training in detecting psychological disor-
ders, they may in some instances be better equipped to diagnose a convicted
child abuser than is a psychiatrist [Id. ].
Since the purpose of preparing this evaluation is apparently to assist in the
reformation of the prisoner and the protection of society, especially chil-
dren, it is likely that the profile prepared by these professionals will consist
of the same basic elements as the studies made by diagnostic facilities of the
Department of Corrections; specifically a scientific study of the prisoner, his
or her career and life history, the apparent causes of his or her criminal acts,
and any recommendations for the prisoner's immediate and future treatment
and employment [See CAL. PENAL CODE §5079].
To facilitate the early detection of child abuse, Section 2192 of the
Business and Professions Code has been amended to add a course in "child
abuse detection and treatment" to the required curriculum of an applicant
for licensure as a physician and surgeon in this state [CAL. Bus. & PROF.
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CODE §2192]. In summary, by requiring that probation and parole investiga-
tions include a psychological evaluation, Chapter 1130 appears to offer the
court and the Community Release Board a greater range of alternatives for
the treatment of convicted child abusers.
See Generally:
1) B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Judgement and Attack in Trial Court
§613A (temporary detention at diagnostic facility) (Supp. 1975).
Criminal Procedure; use of state crime laboratory facilities
Penal Code § 11050.5 (amended).
SB 979 (Sieroty); STATS 1977, Ch 451
Support: California State Bar
Opposition: California Peace Officers' Association
In an apparent response to a legislative proposal from the State Bar of
California [See STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 1975 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION
1-36] the legislature has enacted Chapter 451 to allow private court appoint-
ed counsel access to the laboratory facilities, services, and technical experts
of the State Department of Justice in those counties that have contracted
with the attorney general for the use of such facilities and services [CAL.
PENAL CODE §11050.5]. Formerly, access to such experts as fingerprint and
document examiners, criminalists, and intelligence specialists was limited
to public defenders, and state and local law enforcement officials [CAL.
STATS. 1974, c. 114, §1 at 230]. It has been argued, however, that the need
for such technical and laboratory assistance is greater for a private court
appointed counsel who, unlike a public defender, does not have funds
budgeted for such purposes [STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 1975 CONFERENCE
RESOLUTION 1-36]. To this end, Section 11050.5 of the Penal Code has been
amended to grant a private court appointed counsel the same access to crime
laboratory facilities and technical personnel as is presently afforded a public
defender [CAL. PENAL CODE §11050.5]. Section 11050.5 continues to
provide, however, that unless the county, whose public defender or court
appointed counsel has requested the use of these facilities, contracts with the
attorney general for the payment of the reasonable costs of services pro-
vided, no information, services, or facilities will be made available to these
state employed defenders [CAL. PENAL CODE § 11050.5(b)].
In addition, Chapter 451 requires that the results of any analysis or other
information obtained from a state laboratory must be transmitted to the
district attorney of the county in which the public defender or court appoint-
ed counsel is located [CAL. PENAL CODE §11050.5(c)]. The state bar
originally recommended that this provision be deleted from the new law
arguing that it exposed attorneys who used the privilege to charges of
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violating their clients confidentiality and subjected them to possible mal-
practice actions [See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §6068(e); STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA 1975 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION 1-36]. Nevertheless, the legis-
lature rejected this recommendation by retaining such language and also
declaring that in the event the requirement of transmitting information to the
district attorney is held to be invalid, Section 11050.5(b), which grants
crime laboratory privileges to court appointed counsel and public defenders,
will become inoperative [CAL. PENAL CODE § 11050.5(c)].
See Generally:
I) B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Introduction §8 (Bureau of Criminal Iden-
tification and Investigation) (Supp. 1975).
2) 6 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1974 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 282-83 (laboratory and
technical assistance) (1975).
Criminal Procedure; forfeiture of property
Health and Safety Code § 11499 (new); §§ 11470, 11491.7, 11492, 11493
(amended).
SB 386 (Deukmejian); STATS 1977, Ch 771
Support: California Attorney General
In response to an apparent oversight in prior legislation [See CAL. STATS.
1976, c. 1407, § 1, at-], the legislature has enacted Chapter 771 to extend
forfeiture penalties to persons who allow others to use their vehicles to
transport controlled substances [CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11470(e)].
Formerly, a boat, airplane, or any other vehicle, was subject to forfeiture
pursuant to Section 11470 of the Health and Safety Code only if the state
could prove that the owner had knowingly used such a vehicle for the
purpose of unlawfully transporting controlled substances [See CAL. STATS.
1976, c. 1407, §12, at-]. At the forfeiture hearing, the state had the burden
of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that such an owner had
knowledge that the vehicle was used for illegal purposes [CAL. STATS.
1976, c. 1407, §11, at-; see CAL. EvID. CODE §115]. The court or jury,
however, had to find that the owner's vehicle, boat or airplane was not used
to illegally transport controlled substances before such vehicle was released
to the owner [See CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1407, §13, at-]. In addition, if the
court or jury found against the owner, persons holding a security or other
interest in the vehicle could previously avoid forfeiture of the interest only if
they could prove that they had no knowledge of the illegal use of the vehicle
when they acquired the interest [See CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1407, §§12, 13,
at-; CAL. EVID. CODE §115].
Chapter 771 has amended Section 11470 of the Health and Safety Code to
provide that a vehicle used to unlawfully transport controlled substances is
now subject to forfeiture if either the owner or some other defendant is
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arrested and convicted in connection with such a crime [CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 11470(e)]. Furthermore, to affect title or interest in a vehicle
the state now has the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt at a
forfeiture hearing that either the owner or interest holder in a vehicle that
was used to illegally transport controlled substances, consented to the use of
the vehicle with knowledge that it would be used for such illegal purposes
[CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY Code §§11491.7, 11492]. Consistent with this
concept of placing an increased burden of proof on the state, Chapter 771
also specifies that any vehicle confiscated must be released to the person
entitled unless a court or jury specifically finds that the vehicle was used in
the illegal transportation of illicit substances [CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§11493]. If a court or jury finds, however, that the vehicle was used for such
illegal purposes, but does not find that the person holding a lien, mortgage,
security interest, or interest under a conditional sales contract on the vehicle
acquired this interest with knowledge of the intended use, then the vehicle,
boat, or airplane must either be directly released to the security interest
holder or released upon payment of the owner's equity if the amount owed
to the interest holder is less than the appraised value of the vehicle [See
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11493]. Finally, Chapter 771 has added
Section 11499 to the Health and Safety Code to declare the legislature's
intent that nothing contained in Sections 11470 through 11499 should be
construed to change or extend existing case law relating to search and
seizure. In summary, Chapter 771 extends the penalty of forfeiture of a
vehicle used in the illegal transportation of controlled substances to those
cases in which the vehicle was operated by a person other than the owner,
but declares that the state must now prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the owner consented to such use with knowledge of the intended illegal use
before any forfeiture may be imposed.
See Generally:
1) 8 PAC. L.J., REvIEW OF SELECTED 1976 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 312 (forfeiture of
property used to unlawfully transport controlled substances) (1977).
Criminal Procedure; petit theft-prior conviction
Penal Code §666 (amended).
AB 1150 (Cordova); STATS 1977, Ch 296
(Effective July 8, 1977)
Support: California Peace Officers' Association
Opposition: California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
Chapter 296 amends Penal Code Section 666 to provide that a person
convicted of petit theft who has previously been convicted of and incar-
cerated for petit theft, grand theft, burglary or robbery is now subject to
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imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or in the state
prison. Imprisonment in the state prison would be for a period of sixteen
months, two years, or three years [CAL. PENAL CODE §18]. By contrast a
person without prior convictions is subject to confinement for six months in
the county jail and/or a fine of up to $1,000 upon conviction of petit theft
[CAL. PENAL CODE §490].
Prior to July 1, 1977, the effective date of the Uniform Determinate
Sentencing Act, conviction for petit theft subsequent to a conviction for any
felony or petit theft was punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor
[Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §17 with CAL. STATS. 1957, c. 1284, §1, at
2607]. The Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act, however, provided that
conviction for petit theft would be punishable as a felony-misdemeanor only
if the prior conviction was for petit theft or petit larceny [CAL. STATS. 1976,
c. 1139, §266, at -]. Therefore, under the Uniform Determinate Sentenc-
ing Act, a person convicted of petit theft who had a previous misdemeanor
conviction for the same offense, was subject to greater punishment than a
person with a previous felony conviction for some other offense [Compare
CAL. PENAL CODE §490 with CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §266, at -].
Chapter 296 now subjects those with prior burglary or theft-related convic-
tions to possible felony punishment for any subsequent petit theft convic-
tions, and thus, would appear to resolve this prior incongruity in the law. It
is interesting to note, however, that burglary, though commonly associated
with theft, is not necessarily theft-related since it is defined as entering
various specified places with the intent to commit any felony [See CAL.
PENAL CODE §459]. In addition, Chapter 296 also deletes from Section 666
the redundant reference to "petit larceny" [Compare CAL. STATS. 1957, c.
1284, §1, at 2607 with CAL. PENAL CODE §666]. "Theft" is a statutory
term that includes the offense formerly called "larceny" [See B. WrrKrN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Crimes Against Property, §365 (1963)], and "lar-
ceny" in California statutes must be read as "theft" [CAL. PENAL CODE
§490a]. Thus, Chapter 296, in an attempt to supplement the Uniform
Determinate Sentencing Act [CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 296, §3, at-], clarifies
the punishment for persons convicted of petit theft who have prior burglary
or theft-related convictions by subjecting such persons to the increased
punishment of a felony-misdemeanor.
See Generally:
1) 9 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1977 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 469 (determinate sen-
tencing) (1978).
2) 8 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1976 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 282 (Uniform Determi-
nate Sentencing Act) (1977).
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